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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
In what is widely regarded as the holy grail of macroeconomics, acquiring an intimate understanding 
of the causes and consequences of empirical financial crises remains at the epicentre of modern day 
macroeconomics.  This paper intends to explore both the origins as well as the likely economic 
implications of numerous observed economic crises (with a particular emphasis on the on-going 
Global Financial Crisis which appears to have climaxed in 2008).  Considerable research has been 
conducted to explore the effects of recently observed aggressive liquidity management undertaken by 
policy authorities (unprecedented expansion of money supply), along with various other reactive 
monetary tactics observed in both developed and emerging markets following the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis.  During the course of this research several economic theories are employed to 
explore the likely consequences of various central bank monetary policy responses to a contracting 
economic environment.  The imminent task of deleveraging government (treasury as well as central 
bank) and private sector balance sheets is also scrutinised from the perspectives of both short-term 
regional specific economic growth, as well as the long-term sustainability of the global economy. 
Next, this thesis will propose mechanisms available to manage the inherent risks of ‘artificially 
stimulated’ liquidity and will further explore the reliability of such recommendations.  This research 
aims to gain an understanding of the inherent dangers of heightened market liquidity emanating from 
economic crisis responses, as well as the subsequent perils of artificially inflated asset prices.  Given 
the often deferred effects of expansionary monetary policy, the importance of asset valuation 
measurement will provide an opportunity to isolate the risk of asset bubbles forming and the 
consequent risk of a renewed threat of economic contraction. 
Various explanations such as the financial market prices framework described by Taylor (1995), can 
be cited concerning individual instances where the transmission of financial stress between regions 
has ensued following an economic crisis.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that all regions do not 
participate equally in asset price recoveries following differing central bank interventions. The 
implications of conventional theories of monetary policy will be considered amid the backdrop of 
forthcoming geographic dynamics (more specifically the two-speed economic recoveries observed in 
both emerging and developed economies in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis), whilst 
remaining mindful of the effects of global monetary flows.  Advocates of conventional monetary 
policy (along with their rigid belief in the necessity of overlooking asset prices when formulating 
monetary policy) are invalidated in this research, on the grounds of theoretical reasoning. Theoretical 
explanations derived from equity price correlation and US Treasury yield spreads have been utilised 
to objectively identify asset price bubbles.   
 
Finally, looking beyond the 2008 Global Financial Crisis an assessment is conducted of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s growth prospects.  With the global economic recovery unique in its fragility, consideration of 
further down-side risk is warranted.  Given the necessity of a bespoke risk management approach by 
potential investors in precarious emerging markets, a generic county specific stress-test is proposed as 
a practical means of quantifying potential investor pitfalls.        
 
This thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 will commence by providing an exhaustive grounding 
regarding the roles and influences of monetary policy given an unfavourable macroeconomic climate.  
A comprehensive account of the causes and consequences of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis will 
then be presented.  The chapter concludes by assimilating empirical findings with the now imminent 
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task of government balance sheet deleveraging.  With government debt and central bank liabilities at 
unsustainably excessive levels, the process of deleveraging back to pre-crisis levels without disturbing 
an already fragile economic recovery is likely to prove an uncomfortable challenge. Chapter 3 adopts 
a proactive methodology (buy using forward looking indicators) which attempts to provide insight 
into the anticipated economic progress of the post 2008 economic recovery.  Theoretical proposals are 
discussed on the likely economic implications for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, as well as how a 
potential investor in the region might embark on the prerequisite of risk management.   
 
 
Chapter Two - Literature Review 
 
Some of the most important and lasting questions faced by policymakers and central bankers in the 
wake of a significant economic contraction centre around the appropriateness of policies in 
accelerating economic growth and restoring gross domestic product to their natural levels.  Broad 
consensus indicates that central banks have a mandated responsibility to stabilise and re-establish 
economic growth following an economic crisis (such as the US Humphrey-Hawkins Act passed in 
1978).  However the optimal strategy which should be undertaken to reinvent these favourable market 
conditions remains a controversial debate.    
The intended consequence of this literature review, while not leading to any generic explanatory 
model with which central bankers can anticipate optimal monetary policy, rather aims to explore 
remedies to counter significant contractions in gross domestic product.  The intention of this research 
is to identify a number of common structural characteristics which may be utilised as a framework for 
discussions and analyses in obtaining a tailored liquidity response to an economic crisis.  Acquiring 
an understanding of the evolution of economic fundamentals as well as an account of our most recent 
economic experiences is an imperative prerequisite necessary to contextualise the finding of this 
research.  In line with mainstream macroeconomic theory the principal response available to central 
bankers in the stabilization of a contracting economic environment remains a supportive thrust of 
accommodative monetary policy, and the subsequent increase of liquidity in financial markets to 
induce emergency market stabilisation.  
 
I. Macroeconomic Policy 
Whist attempting to provide a foundation upon which one can analyse the various phases of the global 
economic cycle, particular emphasis has been placed on the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 
several years both proceeding and succeeding the exceptional events which took place.  The 
unprecedented scale of this most recent crisis provides an ideal opportunity to scrutinise our 
understanding of macroeconomics during periods of severe fiscal fragilities (large deficits) and 
extreme liquidity disruptions (plummeting asset prices).  Of particular interest are the pragmatic 
synergies between our theoretical economic understanding and practical observations witnessed 
during this period of exception.   
The dissection between conventional economics and the insurgence of heterogeneous schools of 
economic thought leaves much for economists to contemplate.  As pointed out by Roche (2012), 
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given the events which followed the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the notorious government bond 
vigilante myth has now been exposed.  The government bond vigilante myth is an archaic theory that 
suggests bond investors will revolt against elevated levels of sovereign debt.  The idea of an 
oversupply of sovereign debt issued diminishing investors desire to hold these government backed 
assets, has been proven largely mistaken.  The widespread belief that the financial system has reached 
a point of self-sustainability, Geithner (2008), has similarly proven a premature supposition.   And 
finally the disingenuous assurance by banks that financial innovation has made risk management 
omnipotent, confirmed equally erroneous.   
Another fable which appears to have been dispelled is the flawed predictions of hyperinflation 
following the US Federal Reserve’s introduction of aggressive monetary policy.  Closer scrutiny of 
the events preceding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis provide further insight into some of the 
challenges faced by policymakers as financial institution lending appears to have experienced 
persistent declines, despite ever increasing reserves.  Conventional thinking might once have 
perceived financial institution activities peculiar as abundant liquidity supplied by the Federal Reserve 
to reduce the initial funding stresses of 2008 would have been expected to have been met by a 
willingness to lend and make markets (thus deploying available resource to potentially profitable 
transactions), however as we now know, this is not necessarily the case.  Bernanke (2009|A) offers the 
explanation that concerns regarding capital, asset quality, and the risk of credit, limits the enthusiasm 
of many intermediaries to extending credit notwithstanding the abundance of liquidity. 
Recent events have motivated the necessity to re-examine conventional economic ideologies.  Roubini 
(2006) for example, argues for the inclusion of asset prices (along with traditional considerations such 
as inflation and economic output) as a necessary consideration in the determination of an optimal 
interest rate rule to be executed by global central banks.  The debate surrounding whether central 
banks should target asset prices is on-going, with Roubini (2006) advocating the necessity of 
monetary policy responding to extreme changes in the market prices of assets.  Bernanke and Gertler 
(2001) on the other hand support the view of limiting the influence of asset prices on monetary policy 
to the extent that changes in asset prices might have effects on inflationary expectations (and thus 
rather find favour with an inflation targeting policy).    
 
Macroeconomic paradigms 
Langdana (2002) provides a useful overview of the evolution of mainstream economic schools of 
thought, along with a well-articulated account of the events which appear to have motivated the 
observed paradigm shifts.  
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Emerging Economies 
New Keynesian 
 
Under the Classical Model macroeconomic policies are reliant on assumptions pertaining to both price 
changes, as well as wages.  Defects in the Classical Model quickly became apparent during the onset 
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of the 1929 Great Depression.  During the period of the Great Depression classical economists 
remained dogmatic advocates of ‘natural’ levels of unemployment and output.  Reliant on the belief 
that nothing could or should be done; classical theorists were not amiable to calls for discretionary 
macro-policy.  It was Keynes (1937) who unsettled classical tradition by promulgating a mechanism 
by which fiscal and monetary policy may influence an economies long-term trajectory.  Following the 
Great Depression a prevalent shift towards the Keynesian Model was witnessed.  Under the newfound 
Keynesian framework proactive fiscal and monetary policies allowed for the incorporation of inflation 
and output growth, providing the opportunity for policy maker to tweak macroeconomic policy with 
superior precision.  Widespread beliefs that unregulated financial markets were fundamentally 
unstable motivated the US government to introduce a comprehensive regulatory system, such as the 
Glass-Steagall Act.  During the period of the Keynesian Model’s supremacy, strict government 
regulation appeared an effective deterrent to severe economic crises. 
In the 1970s economic theorists promptly revisited the importance of the quantity of money, as 
inflation quickened in developed economies to the point where price stability was under threat.  Oil 
shocks and the subsequent economic and financial instability during the 1970s led to further evolution 
in macroeconomic consensus.  A noted divergence between developed and emerging market 
economies led to the departure of a common macroeconomic model.  In the case of developed 
economies macroeconomists appeared to find favour with the view that ‘the roles of government 
spending and monetary policy in influencing employment and output (GDP) were minimal at best’ 
(see Friedman Doctrine below).  It was this philosophy which would later become known as the 
rational expectations model, where the shifting emphasis became fixated on deregulation, tax cuts, 
and less government in general.  Deep rooted regulation previously erected to safeguard economic 
stability was deconstructed through orchestrated stages of deregulation.  Vocal activists of 
deregulation included financial institutions whose arguments relied heavily on the efficient financial 
market theory.  The focus on tight financial market regulation shifted towards a new ‘globally-
deregulated neoliberal capitalism’, Crotty (2009). 
Gradually the focus on the supply of money became subservient, whereby by the end of the twentieth 
century policymaker found themselves focusing exclusively on the supervision of interest rates and its 
voluminous implications (see Taylor Rule below).  Such implications include actual inflation, output, 
and employment.  Economists and policymakers of late now face two vastly dissimilar models 
(namely the Rational Expectations and New Keynesian Model) which both compete for dominance in 
a globally-deregulated macroeconomic environment, and both of which boast forceful support from 
distinguished academics.  Subsequent to the events which unfolded in the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis the creditability of financial deregulation remains a contentious debate.  Post crisis 
developments such as the Dodd-Frank Act and the progression of the Basel III global regulatory 
standards are testament to this regulatory evolution. 
Whilst the theoretical structure above is worthy of note, dogmatic recognition of any specific 
implications dictated by any one unique model will not be necessary of the purposes of this research. 
An understanding of macroeconomic theoretical progression does however serve as an invaluable 
foundation upon which to contextualise the events which unfolded during the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis.  Perhaps more constructively this research will attempt to take a less rigid interpretation by 
electing to isolate and concentrate on the short-run effects of liquidity on asset prices, therefore 
diluting the significance of discrepancies present in the above mentioned macroeconomic 
philosophies. 
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II. 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
In a 2003 presidential address former Nobel Prize recipient Robert Lucas was noted as stating that 
macroeconomics had ‘solved, for all practical purposes the problem of economic depression’, Lucas 
(2003).  Today, faced with an economic crisis so deeply rooted in the global economy that even 
unprecedented and coordinated interventions by various governments have thus far failed to 
quarantine the harmful contagion, there is an onus on economic scholars to scrutinise how our 
understanding of the financial system proved so conceited.   
At the outbreak of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis the five largest independent US investment banks 
appeared at the epicentre.  After sustaining considerable flash flood losses two such banks (Bear 
Stearns on the 16
th
 of March 2008 and Lehman Brothers on the 15
th
 of September 2008) failed, one 
was subject to an emergency take-over by a conglomerate (Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of 
America on September 14th 2008), and two were transformed into bank holding companies (Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley) to qualify them for government financial support.  The apparent origin of 
 
The Friedman Doctrine 
Prior to the new Keynesian and rational expectations 
model Friedman (1963,1968) outlined the role of monetary 
policy in developed economies by highlighting the 
inability of monetary policy to consistently ensure full 
employment and high GDP growth over extended periods 
of time. 
Friedman established that whilst an increase in monetary 
supply (LM curve shift to the right) might achieve the 
short-term output and interest rate desired, long-term GDP 
levels and unemployment would return to their natural 
levels as price increases would prevail (LM curve would 
snap back to the original point).  Real wages would 
maintain unchanged.   
According to Friedman the only lasting effects of a 
developed economies increase in monetary supply would 
be an increase in inflation.  This theory proposes that 
monetary policy cannot and should not be used to attain 
long-term output, interest rates, and employment targets. 
Friedman advocated the ‘x percent money-growth rule’, 
which sees central banks of developed economies adhere 
rigidly to a fixed money growth rule, irrespective of 
demand-side stabilisation necessities.   
In the US, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker adopted 
this policy in the 1970s, where inflation finally declined 
from 10.5% in the 1970s to 3% by the 1980s.  The legacy 
of this policy however soon came under immense scrutiny 
as the 1980-1981 recession ensued. 
The effectiveness of the ‘x percent money-growth rule’ 
often comes under intense political pressure as government 
calls for measures to spur growth and employment.   
The Taylor Rule 
Formulated by John Taylor (1993,1998) the Taylor Rule 
provides a framework for policymakers to determine 
exactly how much interest rates should be adjusted in 
response to deviations of actual inflation, output, and 
employment from their specified targeted levels. 
The theory dictates that adjustments in central bank 
interest rates are required to be disproportionately larger 
than changes to the inflation rate.  According to the Taylor 
Rule this act will ensure the real interest rate (nominal rate 
minus inflation) increases.  The rise in real interest rate, 
will in turn slow down the economy by reducing spending 
(AD curve will shift to the left).  Consequentially inflation 
will decline downward towards its targeted range. 
Whilst several versions have emerged, the simplified 
version of the Taylor Rule can be expressed as follows: 
Federal Funds Rate = 2 + (πt) + 0.5(πt - πt*) + 0.5(Yt - Yt*) 
Where:  
πt    = Prior four quarters inflation 
πt* = Federal Open Market Committees inflation target 
Yt    = Current GDP growth rate 
Yt* = Trend rate of growth of real GDP potential 
 
Accordingly if actual inflation exceeds its targeted level, 
or if real GDP growth exceeds the long-term trend rate, 
policymakers should avoid monetary growth and increase 
short-term interest rates. 
 
Whilst resent economic developments and practical 
observations have rendered the coefficients provided 
above deficient, the intuition of the Taylor Rule model 
remains valid.   
Source: Langdana (2002) 
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this septicity has been identified as widespread and perverse incentives that encouraged excessive risk 
and exacerbated high-leverage strategies, amongst other contributing factors.  More than four years 
after the Global Financial Crisis began policymakers need to revisit their understanding of the origin 
of this financial calamity.  Whilst the focus on government deficits continues to dominate discussions, 
policymakers would be astute to acknowledge that these deficits are a necessary consequence of the 
crisis, and not as many may believe, the cause, Krugman and Layard (2012).   
Perverse Incentives 
Fees generated by excessively risky investment strategies during periods of financial market excess 
corrupted virtually all financial institutions during the run up to 2008.  Financial innovation along 
with the widespread progression of derivative instruments appears largely responsible for the 
extensive utilisation of securitization by financial institutions.  Through the usage of derivative type 
structures, financial institutions found themselves capable of redistributing risk through the process of 
securitization.  In the case of securitization, claims to assets backed by a pool of loans or receivables 
were structured in tranches.  These newly devised tranches boasted the ability to isolate and 
redistribute risk (as well as accompanying returns).  Financial institution involvement in the practice 
of securitisation often extended beyond simply the origination of these asset backed securities, to 
include the secondary responsibility of distribution.  Both functions were often seen as a principal 
source of financial institution profitability prior to the market collapse of 2008.  Asset backed 
securities were not limited to the liability side of financial institutions, and were also frequently held 
as variable term assets.     
Commercial and investment banks, private equity funds, hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, 
and insurance companies all appear guilty of generating short-term profits (and thus bonuses) by 
engaging in highly leveraged strategies and attempting to boost fee-based income by the innovative 
practise of securitization.  High revenues generated from excessive risk taking translated into top 
investment bank traders and bank executives receiving hefty bonuses. To provide merely two 
examples, in 2006 Goldman Sachs’ employees bonus’s totalled $16 billion, an average bonus of 
roughly $650,000 for each of Goldman Sachs’ 25,000 employees, Crotty (2009).  Another fitting 
example is Merrill Lynch, where approximately 700 employees each received bonuses in excess of $1 
million in 2008 undeterred by the fact that the firm recorded a loss of $27 billion in that same year, 
Crotty (2009).  Evident is the fact that incentives intended to stimulate business volumes and thus risk 
taking, were not aligned to the accountability of the individuals tasked with such responsibilities.   
Credit rating agencies appear also to have failed to align their profits with the general wellbeing of 
society, as corporate customer’s desires for triple-A ratings corrupted their better judgement.  Basel II 
guidelines required banks to only possess a modest sliver of capital against triple-A rated assets.  High 
credit ratings of the institutions/assets translated into lower borrowing costs for a firm, which meant 
higher profits, higher potential leverage, and ultimately higher potential employee bonuses, Crotty 
(2009).  Companies requesting to be rated were directly responsible for the costs payable to credit 
rating agencies for their services.  Given the existence of several respected rating agencies the 
incentive to maintain client business by keeping their customers content (in terms of their perception 
of the institution that they were dealing with) was undeniably present.   
According to Crotty (2009), perhaps even more alarming was that in 2005, more than 40% of 
Moody’s revenues was attributable to the rating of securitized debt such as mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).  A mortgage backed security is a type 
of asset backed security which is ultimately secured by an underlying mortgage loan or pool of 
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mortgage securities.  A collateralised mortgage obligation on the other hand is a specific type of 
mortgage backed security which is characterised by differing pass-through rates separated into various 
tranches, each of which may also vary in terms of risk and maturity.  Many of these illiquid, non-
transparent, yet in retrospect absurdly highly rated instruments would later be observed defaulting in 
the years to follow. 
 
Katz, Salinas, and Stephanou (2009) describe anecdotal evidence of credit rating agencies deviating 
from their conventional assumptions when rating asset backed securities, whilst failing to adequately 
disclose such abnormalities.  Further their research adds support to the view that credit rating agencies 
were guilty of relaxing traditional credit rating criteria (which in part was a result of understaffing, 
inadequate databases, and deficient rating models) when considering the credit ratings of asset backed 
securities in the years preceding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.   
  
Despite the well documented failure of these rating agency organisations (Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings to name but a few) as custodians of debt market welfare, it seems peculiar 
that capital market stakeholders continue to look to rating agencies for guidance through trusting eyes. 
Financial Products Transparency Compromised by Innovation 
Innovation of financial products, for example mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs), extended to a point where such instruments had often been described as ‘so 
complex they were inherently non-transparent’, Crotty (2009, p.566).  Hefty profits experienced by 
financial institutions motivated a substantial increase in the innovative construction of these products. 
The frequent compromising of the transparency of these intricate products weakened market 
efficiency (due to imperfect price information), adding to the challenge of pricing these instruments.  
The vast majority of these derivative products were traded over the counter (OTC) thus ultimately 
further weakening efficient price discovery (not traded on a regulated exchange).  Valuations by 
investment banks and rating agencies were often derived from complex statistical simulation models 
prone to manipulation, and notorious for a lack of reliability.  In the words of Roubini (2008) CDOs 
‘were new, exotic, complex, illiquid, market-to-model (prices influenced to a large extent by the type 
of valuation model being utilised) rather than market-to-market and misrated by rating agencies.  Who 
could then ever be able to correctly price or value a CDO cubed?’ 
As observed by Blanchard (2011) the sheer complexity of these opaque financial instruments along 
with the existence of special purpose vehicles (described further in the reading) presented grave 
challenges when attempting to assess a financial institution’s solvency.  Testament to the inherent lack 
of transparency and inability to accurately value CDOs during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
Merrill Lynch in July 2008 agreed to sell $30.6 billion of CDO tranches (previously boasting Triple-A 
credit ratings) for 22 cents on the dollar, Hull (2010, p. 388). 
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Whilst theoretically a problem, practically this lack of understanding regarding the valuation of 
various securitised assets was easily disguised during periods of market excess (liquid markets with 
an evident growth trajectory).  In contrast, during periods of price contractions (specifically when 
defaults increased), this lack of understanding exacerbated panic, and the decline in both the demand 
and liquidity of these assets, causing asset backed securities prices to plummet.  Ambiguity with 
regard to the solvability and liquidity of counterparties to asset backed security transactions 
contributed further to market participant’s anxiety.  Prices of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 
were particularly vulnerable to the widespread panic selling.  Collateralised debt obligations are a 
form of asset backed security whereby the underlying assets are characterised by debt obligations.  
Similar to collateralised mortgage obligations, originators of collateralised debt obligations 
redistribute risk (and return) by pooling assets and creating tranches prior to distribution.  As observed 
by Crotty (2009), it was estimated that by February 2009, almost half of all the CDOs ever issued had 
defaulted.  Defaults resulted in a 32% decline in the value of the super-safe senior tranches of triple-A 
rated CDOs, and a staggering 95% loss on mezzanine tranches of triple-A rated CDOs, Crotty (2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout 2008 the derivative avalanche continued to gain traction, causing CDO prices across 
global markets (the majority of which were over-the-counter) to decline drastically.  Global CDO 
issuance declined 84% from $177 billion in the first quarter of 2007 to less than $20 billion a year 
later, Crotty (2009).  Large investment banks who had become accustomed to the lucrative fees 
flowing from originating CDOs began to witness significant holes in their balance sheets emerging.  
Balance sheet pressure was derived not only from plummeting fee based income as a result of the 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
03/08/2007 28/12/2007 30/05/2008 31/10/2008 27/03/2009 28/08/2009
15 September 2008 
Lehman Brothers declares bankruptcy 
The adjacent Ted Spread (LIBOR minus 
the US 3-month Treasury bill rate) 
serves to capture the risks that banks 
perceive in lending to one another.  
Apparent is the dramatic increase in the 
perceived financial institution lending 
risk witnessed in September 2008, 
following the bankruptcy of US Leman 
Brothers Bank.   
By capturing the deviation in the US 3-
month Treasury bill rate (risk-free rate) 
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is able to accurately gauge financial 
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Figure 1: Ted Spread 2007 - 2009 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of a Collateralised Debt Obligation Origination 
 
 
Amalgamated 
Loan Portfolio 
Universe of individual loan assets Step 1: Pool loan assets 
Step 2: Amalgamated loan 
portfolio is allocated into tranches 
Step 3: Stand-alone tranches either 
distributed or held by the originator  
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Loan 3 
Loan 4 
Loan 5 
Tranche 1 - 6%  p.a. 
Tranche 2 - 8%  p.a. 
Tranche 3 - 10%  p.a. 
Tranche 4 - 12%  p.a. 
Tranche 1 - 2013 to 2014 
Tranche 2 - 2014 to 2016 
Tranche 3 - 2016 to 2018 
Tranche 4 - 2018 to 2020 
Expected return Expected payment date 
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demand for CDOs subsiding, but also from the decline in value of CDO assets present on investment 
banks balance sheets.  According to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report released in 2011, 
Merrill Lynch was found to have originated a total of $38.9 billion in mortgage-related CDOs in 2006 
(fetching fees in excess of $1 billion between 2003 and 2006).  The maintenance of these profitable 
CDO origination levels saw Merrill Lynch ‘pursue strategies which involved repackaging riskier 
mortgages more attractively, or begin buying its own products when no one else would’, FCIC (2011, 
p. 202). 
The abrupt end to a decade long boom, fuelled largely by financial novelty, has led to widespread 
economic and financial ramifications.  Posed with the question of how banks were permitted to 
tolerate this unbalanced risk on their balance sheets one is undoubtedly drawn to the regrets of 
insufficient regulation.  As mentioned previously, the 1970s were characterised by a new found 
enthusiasm for deregulation in several developed economies (such as the United States of America).  
It is this very lack of regulation which provided the ideal environment within which financial 
innovation could flourish.  Credit default swaps (a form of credit security which insures/guarantees 
the credit worthiness of the debt security) made it possible for originators of CDOs to transfer the risk 
of default to the issuer of the credit default swap instrument (for example insurance companies such 
as AIG).  The advent of credit default swaps changed the structured finance market, and assisted 
banks in portraying that adequate risk management strategies were in place.  Inspired interpretation of 
the terms of Basel I rules saw banks declaring CDO instruments on their balance sheets as held-for-
trading.  As accountants will attest, held-for-trading securities are traditionally presumed not to be 
present on a company’s books for extended period of time, and are often seen as short-term 
investments.  This presumption fails to account for the innate characteristic of CDO instruments 
which commonly entail long-term investment horizons (especially higher yielding tranches), 
illiquidity (due to trading primarily taking place via over-the-counter markets), sluggish engineering 
time parameters (with the origination process often taking several weeks), and the characteristic of 
extreme price volatility in the event of a crisis. 
Despite the widespread failure of financial regulation to adequately ring fence the risks posed by 
reckless and highly leveraged bank strategies, there appear rare instances of authorities sounding 
caution, such as the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of England.  The Bank of 
England in 2007 called attention to the lopsided growth on global banks’ on-balance-sheets assets 
(such as CDO assets being accumulated by banks themselves) which they claimed had augmented 
from $10 trillion in 2000 to $23 trillion in 2006, Crotty (2009).  This observation unmistakably 
indicates an increase in assets, heightened levels of leverage, and ultimately higher levels of risk being 
adopted by financial institutions.  According to a statement provided by Fitch in 2007, 58% of banks 
that buy and sell credit derivatives (such as credit default swaps) acknowledge that ‘trading’ or 
gambling was their ‘dominant’ motivation for engaging in those transactions, with less than 30% 
motivated by risk management of their own institutions lending, Fitch Ratings (2007).  Few would 
argue that this did not epitomise moral hazard in its purest form (increasing systemic market risk).   
Off-Balance-Sheet Assets of Banks 
The usage of special purpose vehicles (SPV’s) is a popular mechanism utilised for the purpose of 
transferring assets from an institutions balance sheet onto the balance sheet of another independent 
legal structure.  The special purpose vehicle (beneficiary of the transferred assets) is typically a 
separate legal entity and is often a subsidiary of the transferring institution.  The development of 
SPV’s whereby independent holding companies were established to house certain bank assets became 
prevalent in the years preceding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  In 2008 it was reported that 
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Citigroup had assets to the tune of $1.1 trillion in off-balance-sheet entities such as SPV’s (an amount 
equivalent to roughly fifty percent of the company’s total assets), Keoun (2008, July 13).   
The benefits of pursuing stand-alone institutions as holding companies for banks off-balance-sheet 
assets were twofold, firstly by transferring risky assets to these special purpose vehicles and off the 
banks’ balance sheets meant banks were no longer constrained by the requirement to observe 
regulated capital provisions for these assets.  A second noteworthy benefit entailed the ability to 
achieve a superior rating for the autonomous special purpose vehicle (as opposed to the whole 
company), this translated into a more efficient capital structure due to reduced lending costs (thus 
potentially amplified ability to leverage).  Given the specific assets under consideration and more 
specifically their often risky nature, further benefit was at times sought by parent companies 
attempting to divorce themselves from any potential liabilities arising out of these assets in the event 
of losses materialising.    
These special purpose vehicles were constructed to make periodic service fees to the originating 
banks, whilst sheltering the banks from any potential obligations or losses.  Banks providing their 
special purposes vehicles with guaranteed lines of credit in order to secure a privileged credit rating 
did however prove a risk management oversight by these financial institutions during the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, with such contractual obligations requiring several banks to honour their subsidiary’s 
losses.   Preferential lending rates and reduced shareholder scrutiny provided ample motivation for 
excessive leverage of special purpose vehicles which were often comprised of already risky assets.  
During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent collapse of CDOs and MBSs markets, a 
wave of subprime mortgage defaults forced banks to move these contaminated assets from the balance 
sheets of SPV’s back onto their own balance sheets, severely eroding their intentionally thin levels of 
capital.  It was projected in 2008 that the seven largest US banks (including Citigroup) were likely to 
be liable for a aggregated $300 billion in credit and liquidity guarantees, relating to their off-balance-
sheet activities, Keoun (2008, July 13). 
Bank Self-Regulation  
Aligned with the theme of deregulation The Bank for International Settlements recommended that 
national regulators allow banks to assess their own risks due to the complexity of their businesses.  
This evaluation was conducted in the form of a statistical exercise called Value at Risk (VAR).  VAR 
is an approximation of the maximum exposure to potential loss present within a portfolio of securities 
given a specified level of confidence and predefined time horizon.  By vesting the responsibility of 
evaluating themselves banks were provided with the opportunity to ultimately determine their own 
capital requirements, an honour traditionally afforded to objective regulators.  Statistical weaknesses 
inherent in the VAR calculation methodology proved bank self-assessments inaccurate and 
precautionary measures impotent when the 2008 Global Financial Crisis erupted.  Statistical flaws 
were primarily a result of the heavy reliance of the VAR model on assets conforming to the normal 
distribution of return assumption.  The normal distribution assumption is inappropriate for assets 
which are characterised by a negative skewness and large excess kurtosis/fat tails (such as many of 
the mortgage related assets which were present on bank balance sheets).   
 
The Further Integrated the Global Financial System the Greater the Risk of Contagion 
Supporters of global integration have often been quoted declaring victory over the prospect of 
financial crises, implying that widespread diversification has neutralised these ‘primitive’ risks.  
Timothy Geithner in 2006, then New York Fed Chairman (current Secretary of the US Treasury) 
Crisis Economics – Perilous Liquidity | Master of Management in Finance & Investment   
 
13 | P a g e  
 
Steven Schultz 
pronounced ‘in the financial system we have today, with less risk concentrated in banks, the 
probability of a systematic financial crisis may be lower than in traditional bank-centred financial 
systems’, Geithner (2008, p.2).  This imprudent optimism was not unique to Mr. Geithner, in the same 
year the IMF has been quoted as stating that the distribution of credit risks ‘has helped to make the 
banking and overall financial system more resilient’, Tett (2009).  The Bank for International 
Settlements as early as 2005 began to raise questions over the extent to which global credit 
management strategies incorporated the risks inherent to these new derivative instruments (MBS and 
CDOs), pointing to their ‘untested nature’ and a general lack of understanding of ‘how these new 
markets will function under stress’, Knight (2005, p.4). 
Certainly economic logic broadly supports the globalisation of financial markets and their ability to, 
in part, cushion various economic shocks (i.e. not two sigma events).  However this philosophy is 
only tolerable given shocks of controllable measure.  In the event of irrepressible shocks, such as 
those witnessed during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis global integration provided a conduit for the 
transmission of financial stress.  Such transmission was amplified by financial interlinkages and 
asymmetric information, namely the uncertainty surrounding counterparty creditworthiness.   
Danninger et al. (2009) found strong evidence suggesting a ‘co-movement’ of financial stresses 
between emerging and developed economies which were magnified by the intensity of financial 
linkages.      
Risk Hedging Impediment   
Risk hedging undertaken by financial institutions often utilise dynamic derivative trading strategies 
reliant on rational transaction costs and liquid markets to adequately offset any perceived unbalanced 
risks.  A conventional hedge might for example involve the short selling of a risky asset whilst 
simultaneously acquiring a long position in a risk-free asset.  As the strategy is dynamic, on-going 
rebalancing is required given perpetual changes in the asset price, risk-free rate, volatility, or time to 
expiration of the underlying derivative, Crotty (2009).  Volatility intuitively increases when the asset 
price declines, resulting in the dynamic hedge necessitating the risky asset to be sold.  The inherent 
problem with this process is the requirement to sell the risky asset in an environment of declining 
prices, as further pressure compounds the decline sending prices into free-fall.  This theoretical 
shortcoming materialises into a severe problem when the underlying instrument being hedged fails to 
meet the liquidity assumptions upon which the hedging strategy relies.  In the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis this was indeed the case with the majority of CDOs and MBSs which banks sought to neutralise 
their risks through this fundamentally flawed strategy.  Morgan Stanley reported an unprecedented 
mortgage related loss of $2.6 billion in 2008, testimony to the shortcomings of the firms risk hedging 
strategies, Morgan Stanley (2008).  Ultimately banks risk management strategies in this context did 
more to facilitate fragilities in bank balance sheets than alleviate risks. 
Under the catastrophic risk management failures witnessed during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
globalisation was relied upon for its qualities of dispersing risk.  The theoretical intuition was simple; 
less concentration of risk in isolated regions would improve the robustness of all industries now 
benefiting from diversification.  However as previously cited the extent to which global capital 
markets were cohesive simultaneously provided the opportunity for contagion, upon which fractures 
in the US subprime mortgage market were able to rapidly spider throughout the globe.  The speed 
with which shock waves transcended over-the-counter derivative markets into regulated equity 
markets took place on an unprecedented scale, creating substantial fragility in the global financial 
system.  
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Point of No Return  
Given the banks ever increasing extent of financial leverage the pertinent danger then became how to 
control the tsunami of deleveraging by financial institutions once the fuse had been ignited (and the 
possibility of a fatal run on banks).   
 
- 
 
 
 
 
Wall Street Watch (2009) highlighted the magnitude of this task. During the period from 1975 to 
2003, US investment banks leverage (debt to equity) regulated by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission - was capped at a level of 12 times equity capital.  In 2004, under pressure from 
Goldman Sachs chairman (and later Treasury Secretary) Henry Paulson, the acceptable leverage ratio 
was raised to 40 times capital.  According to Blundell-Wignall (2009) US investment banks under the 
new Security and Exchange Commission requirements soon elevated their leverage levels to an 
average of approximately 34.  US banks were not alone in this disingenuous behaviour as several of 
their European peers were also engaging in practices of excessive leverage which at times saw 
leverage ratios in excess of 50, Goodhart (2009).  Astonishingly these ratios were exceeded by both 
Citibank and Bank of America, Ferguson (2008).   
The intuition against levels of excessive leverage is simple, whilst not as profitable when banks have 
high levels of capital (low leverage) they are capable of absorbing potential losses resulting from 
financial shocks without the threat of bankruptcy.  When highly leveraged however, even the slightest 
losses may induce a destabilising effect which ultimately may lead to bankruptcy.  Given the abrupt 
demise of mortgage derivatives (marked to market), financial institutions found their capital depleted 
by losses and forced write-downs, and their balance sheets congested by complex credit products of 
uncertain value.  Off-balance-sheet liabilities emanating from bankrupt special purpose vehicles 
augmented further downside pressure.  
After having been exposed for their monumental failures in the run up to the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, rating agencies were quick at attempting to salvage credibility by revisiting unjustifiably 
optimistic credit ratings.  Credit downgrades even by a modest degree, places large pressure on 
institutions to increase capital requirements.  In an environment where banks faced unrelenting capital 
erosion on their balance sheets by the minute, financial institutions were left little choice but to 
commence liquidating assets in a draconic fashion.  Credit markets quickly froze as the tidal wave of 
deleveraging (lead by distressed financial institutions) swept the global markets. 
Unfolding of Events 
As the events of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis unfolded it appeared that even the most pessimistic 
of projections were to be confirmed overly optimistic.  Faced with housing price declines in the US 
many dismissed the magnitude of the problem and found comfort in that any decline in output could 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of Crisis Deleveraging Cycle 
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be offset by decreasing interest rates.  Today there is little doubt that the trigger for the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis was pulled as early as 2006.   
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
The intuitive question then becomes what contributed to the significant appreciation of home prices 
prior to 2006.  As previously described, mortgage lenders motivated by the potential for short-term 
profits found themselves extending loans to risky (sub-prime) borrowers (previously classified as 
unfit).  Given the buoyant housing market and high loan-to-book values, even a modest erosion of 
house prices often found mortgages exceeding the marketable values of these assets.  As described by 
Blanchard (2011, p.596) ‘the mortgages were in fact much riskier than either the lender pretended or 
the borrower understood’. 
As borrowers began to accelerate defaults bank lenders found themselves exposed to large-scale asset 
write-downs.  According to Blanchard (2011) by mid-2008 mortgage losses were estimated at $300 
million, roughly 2% of the US gross domestic product.  From the beginning of 2007 world gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth began to wane until finally collapsing in 2008.  Growth in the first 
quarter of 2008 was recorded as an annualised -5.7% before declining further to -6.3% in the first 
quarter of 2009.  Emerging markets hoped to be spared from contagion through a regional decoupling 
between developed and emerging economies.  However, as depicted in figure 5 this expectation 
proved little more than an overly optimistic supposition.   
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Figure 5: Collapse of World GDP Growth 
Forecast 
Figure 4: Case-Shiller Index 
Data source: Standard and Poor's 
The adjacent illustration serves as a 
graphical proxy for US house prices 
known as the Case-Shiller index.  
US Housing prices can be witnessed to 
have appreciated sharply from 2000 to 
2006, before experiencing a rapid 32% 
decline from the 2006 peak.   
Whilst the rate of decline appears to have 
lost momentum, anaemic growth to date 
in the US housing sector provides 
negligible evidence of a recovery in this 
sector as of the first half of 2012. 
Breakdown in 
gross domestic product 
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Evidently, transmission of financial stress globally occurred rapidly, and was similarly evidenced by 
the broad disruption of both developed and emerging market stock price indices.  Transmission was 
primarily routed through the following channels: 
i. Decrease in import demand from the US, with demand largely limited to necessities 
(affecting exporting economies). 
ii. Decline in global capital flows, US investors and financial institutions became 
increasingly reluctant to invest abroad. 
iii. Widespread deterioration in confidence. 
iv. Global money markets experienced a sharp decline in flows (freezing). 
v. Economic distress (bank failures) necessitated large scale government intervention, thus 
placing further onus on future taxpayers (consumption declines). 
Each of these consequences placed further downward pressure on global output, gross domestic 
product, and tax revenue.  Blanchard (2011) goes further to highlight the point that less integrated 
economies such as India performed comparatively better than well-integrated peers.  Africa however 
despite the coincidental absence of deep rooted financial linkages suffered a severe shock in the form 
of abating commodity prices. 
 
Policy Intervention 
Under circumstances of unremitting pressure, policymakers saw their hands forced to commit to 
extraordinary policy intervention, promptly and with imperfect information.  In the middle of 2007 
the US Federal Reserve took action by embarking on persistent decreases to the federal funds rate, 
from 5.25% to virtually zero two years later.  This emergency measure was implemented in 
expectation of curtailing contractionary pressures, and was (as reinforced by the figures below) not a 
reactive measure unique to the United States.  Testament to the far-reaching and aligned concerns in 
Europe is the Bank of England’s decision to institute its lowest interest rate in over 300 years. 
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Figure 6: Bank of England Rates Since 1694  
 
 
Figure 7: US Federal Funds Rate  Figure 8: European Central Bank Rate*  Figure 9: Bank of Japan Rate  
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Imperative to ensuring emergency fiscal and monetary measures were not immobilised, governments 
ceded to the importance of acting punctually.  With the deficiencies of the handling of the Japanese 
Crisis in the 1990s and 2000s well documented, government authorities agreed on the hazard of a 
prospective liquidity trap neutralising their emergency measures, given a delay in implementation. A 
liquidity trap describes the condition when an increase in the supply of money fails to lower interest 
rates.  This phenomenon occurs when members of the public, fearing further economic adversity, 
begin to stockpile cash (thus reducing the country’s money multiplier).   
The Federal Reserve and US Treasury immediately embarked on the following emergency measures: 
i. An increase in federal depositors insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 per account, to 
limit the risk of a run on banks. 
ii. An introduction of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which aimed to cleanse 
banks of pockets of toxic assets.   
iii. Widespread measures intended to increase capital markets liquidity and to lubricate the 
financial system were implemented (such as direct government intervention). 
iv. The purchase of numerous ‘unappealing’ assets (such as CDOs, and MBS). 
The universal goal of governments across the global became to urgently increase the capital levels of 
financial institutions, in the hope that such efforts would succeed in averting a global economic 
meltdown.   
Fiscal policy - aligned with emergency monetary measures in the US - took the form of tax alleviation 
and an increase in government spending.  In February 2009 the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act was passed, which called for the provision of a further $780 billion to boost crisis elevating 
efforts in 2009 and 2010.  The programme made allowance for tax cuts of $288 billion, increases in 
social expenditure, and the spending of $170 billion on infrastructure investment to mention but a few 
measures, Blanchard (2011). 
Whilst beneficial in the short-run, many countries have experienced surging levels of debt on account 
of the necessity to fund these stimulatory mechanisms.  Several prominent economists have 
questioned whether this heritage of colossal fiscal deficits can persist, as the creditworthiness of 
governments begins to hamper governments’ sustainability, particularly in regions lacking currency 
flexibility (i.e. European Union members). 
Conclusion 
The rapid globalisation of financial markets, along with widespread deregulation and financial 
innovation has cultivated a highly leveraged financial environment more suited for the purposes of 
serving individual self-interest than the general interest of society.  The reintroduction of regulation 
alone however, will not provide the resolution to the risk of future economic crises, and will likely 
prove largely ineffective unless it proves capable of addressing the perverse incentives that have 
historically pervaded the financial system.  Lessons learnt from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
should see active participation by governments in discouraging the moral hazard which has become 
synonymous with the past decade.  In the future, financial institutions capable of posing a systematic 
risk should be obligated to accept especially close regulatory scrutiny of their risks, Bernanke 
(2009|A). 
To date post-2008 economies which can be described as sluggish at best, appear attributable to pre-
crisis excesses and the misshaped economies which they created.  Over the past few decades financial 
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institutions have enjoyed growth far in excess of the environments within which they operate.  With a 
focus on the US prior to 2008 growth relied too heavily on consumer spending and a surge in house-
buying, both of which were financed largely by foreign savings channelled through an 
undercapitalised domestic financial system (for example the US multinational banks).  A sobering 
observation by Crotty (2009) reveals US household debt was roughly 48% of GDP from 1965 to 
1985.  By 1998 debt had grown to an approximate of 66% of GDP, before accelerating to well in 
excess of 100% by late 2008.  This untenable tread is unsustainable and inevitably must be reversed, 
however this may well prove as much a political challenge as it is economic, with credible long-term 
deficit plans which include both tax increases and cuts to public entitlement programmes a likely 
necessity.  Further imminent consumer deleveraging may still sabotage the desired transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. 
 
III. Role of Central Banks and Government 
Whilst the practical functionality and primary objectives of governments and central banks may differ 
materially, there are instances throughout this reading where both have been described 
interchangeably.  This research serves to focus on the common objectives of government and central 
banks (namely fiscal and monetary policy construction and implementation), rather than their 
differentiating characteristics.  The European Central Bank presents a germane example of the 
indistinct variances between the roles of government and central banks in implementing emergency 
fiscal policy.  In the case of the European Central Bank, direct European sovereign bond market 
intervention was required in 2012 in order to ‘safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
in all countries of the euro area’, Draghi and Constâncio (2012, 6 September).  In effect, this entailed 
government expenditure of several European Union members indirectly being financed through the 
central banks purchases of their peripheral euro zone debt.  From this perspective the monetary policy 
considerations of the European Central Bank have to a large extent been dominated by the fiscal 
needs of its member countries.       
Pertinent to this research will be the functionality of these policy institutions during periods of 
economic distress.  It is under these testing circumstances that the prominence of economic policy 
becomes most apparent.  Policymakers in responding to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis were 
presented with the daunting challenge of avoiding financial collapse in the short-run, while continuing 
to orchestrate the necessary structural financial market overhauls to ensure a sustainable economic 
recovery.  During periods of financial distress policymakers are required to maintain a dual focus on 
both the cushioning of economic shocks on an already vulnerable economy, as well as containing the 
risk of an adverse ‘feedback loop’, in which economic ruptures and financial strains mutate to become 
mutually reinforcing, Bernanke (2009|A). 
Redressing the economic repercussions of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, policymakers around the 
world have been entrusted with a disconcerting task.  First and foremost this entails limiting the 
effects of plummeting asset values, and averting a fatal credit crunch.  Longer-term objectives extend 
to restoring both business and investor confidence, maintaining a tight grasp on inflation, and 
ensuring a sustainable level of economic activity.  As accentuated by Bernanke (2009|A) government 
policy responses will be critical determinants of the speed and vigour of the post 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis recovery.   
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Contemporary explanation of central bank policy success would be deficient without brief mention of 
the victory over inflation witnessed in the United States as well as the United Kingdom during the 
1980s and 1990s, a period which became affectionately known as the ‘Great Moderation’.  During 
this time central banks found favour in monitoring money supply based on the theory of Friedman 
(1969) that ‘inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ for which the stability of 
money demand is an essential prerequisite.  Empirical analysis supports the conclusion that the stable 
money demand assumption was habitually violated, this discovery was a primary contributor to the 
abandonment of money targeting in favour of the now popular inflationary focus. Years to follow saw 
several economists and policymakers gravitate towards a view that controlling inflation was sufficient 
to ensure the stability of economic activity, Jones, Atkins and Harding (2012).  In practice the extent 
of this inflationary focus does however differ by region, for example the South African Reserve Bank 
has been noted as advocates of a flexible inflation strategy (where deviations of actual inflation from 
its predefined target are viewed as acceptable as a means of stabilising output).   An interesting case 
can be observed in the legacy of the European Central Bank which to a large extent inherited its 
monetary policy strategy from the Bundesbank (which boasts a record of great antiquity in 
successfully managing inflation via money supply), Giese and Tuxen (2007).  Accordingly the 
European Central Bank maintains a ‘two-pillar strategy’ which utilises economic indicators, as well as 
placing a ‘prominent role’ on monetary developments in the determination of its future policies.  In 
the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis the European Central Bank has been forced to 
endure the traumatic experience of acting as a fiscal agent for several of its severely indebted 
members. 
The apparent oversight with an inflation-fixated policy (as evidenced by the heightened financial 
sector instability witnessed during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis), is the lack of consideration of 
how these interest rate policies inadvertently influence the behaviour of financial institutions.  
According to Mallaby (2012) the majority of developed economies’ central banks utilise interest rates 
as a measure of targeting inflation, leaving them unable to simultaneously use interest rates to prevent 
bank lending from getting out of hand.   
During periods of economic distress fiscal and monetary mechanisms are tweaked to induce stability.  
Whilst practical challenges emerge when attempting to specify the implications of fiscal or monetary 
policy in isolation, an abridged explanation of these two economic tools will suffice for our purposes.  
Economic contraction is likely to motivate government intervention in the form of an increase in 
government spending, for example an increase in infrastructure spending (shifting the AD curve to the 
right, thus increasing short-term economic output).  The economic intuition behind this act is based 
upon the expectation that the increase in government spending will counterbalance the crisis induced 
reduction in consumer spending and investment.  The increase in government spending, without 
offsetting tax increases (balanced budget fiscal expansion), will predictably be accompanied by a 
proportional increase in government debt.   As a primer to the detailed explanation provided below 
(see section IV deficit financing) we allow for the assumption that government debt is supported by 
exclusively by the sale of government bonds.  Efforts by government spending to induce economic 
stability are often then reinforced by central bank activities to escalate levels of monetary supply 
(through the purchase of government bonds).  Central banks as procurers of government debt inject 
profuse levels of liquidity into the financial system curtailing the risks of a monetary epidemic 
(shifting the LM curve to the right and lowering the short-term interest rate).  Short-term in nature, 
both of these fiscal and monetary measures are subject to longer-term neutrality as the AS-LM curve 
ultimately returns to its natural level.             
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The role of central banks 
The rationale and objectives of various central banks differ vastly, dependent largely on the wellbeing 
of the economic environment in which they operate.  Common to central banks is the duty to act as 
custodian of a nation’s money supply.  The quantity of money supply is managed by central banks 
primarily through three direct control mechanisms, namely: 
i) Open markets operations 
ii) Discount rate policy 
iii) Fluctuating the reserve requirements 
All three of these measures are highly integrated and amplified by the money multiplier.  To provide 
an example of the level of cohesion amongst these mechanisms, consider the example of a central 
bank which has embarked on expansive monetary policy by purchasing government bonds in the open 
market.  Government bond purchases results in financial institutions transforming fixed income assets 
into cash balances, thus increasing the banks cash reserves.  The increase in national monetary supply 
circulating the country’s financial system will be accompanied by a decline in short-term interest rates 
(such as the benchmark repurchase rate).  Open market operations undertaken by the central bank to 
dispose of government bond will have the opposite monetary consequences. 
In the case of the US, the Federal Reserve possesses the ability to dictate the short-term Federal funds 
rate.  The Federal funds target rate is determined by a meeting of the members of the Federal Open 
Market Committee.   Following which, the Federal Reserve embarks on open market operations to 
ensure that the Federal funds effective rate is aligned with the Federal funds target rate.  The Federal 
funds rate is an overnight rate pertinent to banks and other depository institutions for the lending of 
non-interest bearing reserves.  Institutions finding themselves in violation of legislated reserve 
requirements (due to inadequate reserves) are permitted to engage in short-term lending with peer 
institutions that may be in possession of excess reserves.  Overnight lending under this practise will be 
at the expense of the levied Federal funds interest rate.  In many countries a similar rate such as the 
LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) is determined by the device of supply and demand.  It is 
this very open pricing mechanism which has exposed vulnerabilities to manipulation which are 
alleged to have taken place between 2005 and 2009.  The LIBOR aims to represent the rate banks 
charge when lending to one another.  This rate is captured through an auction like process whereby 
banks submit daily estimates of the rates which they would be willing to accept to borrow at that point 
in time.  These private submissions are assembled by the British Bankers Association, and after 
excluding outlier bids, the average borrowing rate is declared as the LIBOR.  In 2012 several 
submitting members were found guilty of aligning their borrowing estimates in an attempt to 
influence this final average.  In the case of the Federal funds rate however, the Federal Reserve has 
authority to dictate this rate, making it an esteemed tool accessible for monetary policy 
administration.    
For our purposes we are particularly interested in the functionality of central banks under 
circumstances of economic contraction, as well as the facilities available to these institutions to 
combat adverse economic conditions.  In discussing the implications of the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, Bernanke (2009|A) specifies the Federal Reserves mandated duties under testing conditions as: 
i) First and foremost the Federal Reserve can be considered as the lender of last resort.  
Under this role market participants look to the Federal Reserve to make available to 
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financial institutions adequate access to short-term liquidity in the hope of averting the 
freezing of money markets during times of extreme financial pressure. 
ii) Provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and various credit participants in key markets.  
Once again fulfilling the responsibility of liquidity provider of last resort, the Federal 
Reserve introduces facilities to purchase highly rated commercial paper, providing crucial 
liquidity to money market funds. 
iii) Finally and perhaps most popular amongst market participants, the Federal Reserve 
purchases long-term securities, increasing the supply of money within an economy.  Over 
time, this direct increase in market liquidity stimulates market activity and theoretically 
also assists in reviving private lending.  As theoretically these elevated levels of business 
and household cash are put to use in economic transactions. 
In response to the effects of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis the Federal Reserve demonstrated the 
ability to engineer innovative and creative facilities in order to ensure economic symptoms were not 
immune to the market anticipated central bank intervention. 
In the context of this research seignorage will be viewed as the empirically preferred response 
undertaken by central banks around the globe to encourage economic growth following an economic 
crisis (however as previously noted policy elements are highly interrelated).  The technicalities of 
central bank intervention often sees the open market purchasing of government bonds (debt) during 
times of extreme financial stress.  Central banks purchasing of government debt, all else constant, 
causes government bond prices increase (increased demand), resulting in yields on these bonds to 
decrease (larger denominator).  Investors selling these securities to central banks are expected to then 
deploy such proceeds on alternative assets, thus raising their prices.  The countries prime lending rates 
will also be expected to decline proportionally to bond yield decreases.  Lower bond yields encourage 
borrowing and thus higher equity prices (raising consumption), both contribute positively to 
investment and serve to boost aggregate demand.  To the extent that investors diversify into foreign 
assets, portfolio rebalancing weakens the domestic currency, thus encouraging exports (this is 
assuming exports are invoiced in domestic currency i.e. producer currency pricing), Economist 
Newspaper Limited (2012|D).   
Weidmann (2012|A) does well to mention the duty of policymakers to uphold pressure on financial 
institutions in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  This perpetual pressure should ensure 
that financial institutions proceed with their necessary restructuring, with the abolition of unviable 
banks and the retaining of earnings to build up much needed capital buffers.  
As explained by Bernanke (2009|A) all three policy mechanisms mentioned above; provision of 
liquidity to credit markets, purchasing of securities, and lending to financial institutions are common 
in nature as they all utilise the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet.  Of particular 
importance during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was the fact that the Federal Reserve was able to 
utilise these tools to continue easing credit conditions regardless of the epic market conditions, and 
despite having already exhausted manoeuvrability of interest rates (federal funds rate was already 
virtually zero).  In what has been commonly referred to as ‘credit easing’ the intention is to provide 
alleviation from economic pressures (emanating from clogged credit channels) through enhanced 
levels of liquidity, and thus to reduce long-term interest rates.   
The liability side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is far simpler, consisting primarily of 
currency issued and banking deposits held (reserves).  Central bank tools can often also be amplified 
by shifts in investor expectations.  Take for example the expectation that a central bank is expected to 
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hold the government debt purchased for an extended period, such a perception is capable of 
supporting the economy by cutting government-borrowing costs and reducing the future burden of 
taxation.  A reputable commitment to keep short-term interest rates suppressed (such as that made by 
the Federal Reseve to maintain depressed short-term rates well into 2015) may indeed gain credibility 
if accompanied by quantitative easing, since the central bank maintains personal interest through its 
holdings of governement debt (of varing maturities) and thus is exposed to the risk of a rise in the 
interest rate.  
Figure 10 below serves to highlight the interest rate trends observed during recent periods of 
significant economic contraction.  Whilst perhaps opague at times the underlying trend is that rates 
are witnessed declining during periods of economic crises, with the hope of economic pressures 
abating.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic intuition dictates that an interest rate decline be complemented by expansive monetary 
policy.  By increasing the supply of money in an economy directly (through quantitative easing) 
central banks effectively expand their balance sheets to accommodate for both government bonds 
purchased in the secondary market (asset side of the balance sheet), as well as the further issuance of 
monetary obligations (liability side of the balance sheet).  As illustrated below central banks 
commitment to supressing interest rates following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis saw an 
unprecedented swelling of their balance sheets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
These sizable expansions in central bank balance sheets are thought by many to be harbingers of 
hyperinflation, an observation which Wolf (2012) has criticized as being ‘idiotic’.  Given the 
surrounding circumstances (the collapse of private financial sectors), central banks have honoured 
Resultant increase in central banks’ balance sheets (as a result of emergency 
liquidity measures) since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
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their governing mandate; they have acted as a lender of last resort during a period of flagrant panic.  
Wolf (2012) described the fact that central banks have saved the world from a second great depression 
as having been disregarded, with a focus instead on their incentives for coming to the aid of banks.  It 
should be noted that ‘nobody gains credit for eliminating a hypothetical event’.  Krugman and Layard 
(2012) do well to remind vocal market commentators of the sequence in which the event of the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis unfolded.  Given the widespread anxiety which ensued after asset prices 
plunged, private sector spending froze, whilst a logical action given these extreme circumstances, 
collectively this prudence becomes self-defeating as it motivates further asset price contraction.  
Government in tern embarked on measures to stabilize this spending deficiency, acting under the 
comprehension that ‘one person’s spending is another’s income’.  Perhaps counterintuitive but a 
reduction in government deficit and/or an increase in taxation would have resulted in an undisputable 
consequence, to exacerbate the already daunting economic problem (conventional Keynesian 
multiplier argument).   
Whilst the short-term merits of monetary stimulus in alleviating pressure during economic turmoil is 
undeniable, the cost of such mechanism sees a transfer of stress to the presumably more robust central 
bank balance sheet.  Policymakers need to establish a balance between their pledge to ensure financial 
system welfare, whist continuing to encourage economic efficiency and innovation.   
Central banks are not only accountable for the degree of liquidity during times of financial distress, 
but need to be mindful of the potential dangers in delaying to provide distressed markets with 
liquidity following a crisis, more specifically the risk of economic stagnation.  The Federal Reserve’s 
actions in the case of the 1929 crisis provide an example of the dangers of failing to increase liquidity 
following the initial signs of a crisis.  By waiting too long to counter the banking credit crunch and 
economic repercussions of the crisis, the Federal Reserve neutralised their ability to influence 
subsequent calamities.  Research by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) supports the view that a more 
accommodative monetary policy may well have reduced the severity of the 1929 Great Depression.  A 
more recent example of a central bank diluting their monetary policy influence on crisis repercussions 
can be observed in the Bank of Japans’ actions in the 1980s.  Failure to identify the bubble, along with 
the delay in deploying monetary policy tools (increasing liquidity through quantitative easing) 
following the initial shock of the bubble imploding rendered Japanese monetary and fiscal policy 
largely ineffective for a prolonged period.  A phenomenon later termed a liquidity trap (economic 
stagnation).     
Insight provided by Bernanke (2009|A) highlights the acknowledged importance of timely and 
aggressive action, ‘in historical comparison, this policy response {2008} stands out as exceptionally 
rapid and proactive’. The Federal Reserve’s attitude regarding their reaction to the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis with the immediate and sizable monetary measures (increased liquidity) whilst an 
improvement on their empirical responses remains vulnerable by failing to acknowledge on-going 
dangers.  Of particular concern are the resultant asset bubbles which stem from escalated levels of 
liquidity (accommodative monetary policy).  Figure 11 below provides evidence of the post 2008 
expansive monetary policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve (termed Quantitative Easing) and the 
subsequent increase in broad equity prices.  Evident below is the encouraging trend of American 
equity prices reacting positively to the increased market liquidity.  
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Closer scrutiny of equity price levels following these abnormal echelons of liquidity warrant caution.  
Economic intuition repudiates the possibility of sound fundamentals underpinning the post-2008 
equity price rebound.  A more sound reasoning would attribute such equity advances as a direct 
repercussion of the short-term elevations in liquidity.  Given the necessity of consumer deleveraging, 
excess liquidity surges into global equity markets (as opposed to further bank lending).  This 
explanation of price behaviour raises several similarities with our current understanding of asset 
bubbles.  Failure to recognise these repercussions resulting from short-term crisis response measures 
by the Federal Reserve consequently appear somewhat disingenuous.  According to Weidmann 
(2012|A) ‘delivering on its primary goal to maintain price stability is the prerequisite for safeguarding 
the most precious resource a central bank can command: credibility’. 
 
Definition of an Asset Bubble 
According to the broadest definition an asset bubble appears to be present when asset prices 
demonstrate a provisional unhinging from their true worth.  Most economists would describe an asset 
bubble as the phenomenon where an asset price significantly exceeds the fundamentally justified 
value of the asset.  Formally, the fundamental value of an asset would entail the discounted present 
value of all cash flows expected to be derived over the life of the asset.  To this end the value of an 
asset can be thought of as the claim to a stream of future payments, in the case of equities such 
payments take the form of dividends.  Intuitively, if the observed market price exceeds this 
fundamental value such asset should be construed as overvalued.  However projecting future cash 
flows with any degree of certainty is a notoriously difficult task.  In the event of the market price 
exceeding its ‘objective’ fundamental value this suggests the asset possesses an intensified 
vulnerability to a price collapse.  According to research by Barlevy (2007) there is always an 
equilibrium in which the asset price declines towards its fundamental value. 
Despite the rather simplistic definition, the task of appropriately identifying an asset bubble in 
practice remains challenging.  The reason for this is the pre-emptive payoff of asset bubbles, as the 
economic value assigned to the task of identifying asset bubbles is derived not by what actually 
transpires, but rather what could potentially happen.   
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Kindleberger (1996) is documented having defined an asset bubble as ‘an upward price movement 
over an extended range that then implodes’.  The aggressive rise and fall of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index presented in figure 12 below, provides several backward looking specimens of such 
price behaviour.   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps a more abstract documented example of an asset bubble can be dated back to the seventeenth-
century, where the price of tulip bulbs in the Nertherlands (Tulipmania) became arguably the most 
primitive exhibit of an asset bubble recorded. Most economists at this point will argue that the 
definition provided is flawed by ambiguity.  Economists do however concede that dramatic increases 
in asset prices serve as a dependable cause for concern, Barlevy (2007).  This is largely due to the 
rapid pace in which asset prices are often observed to have advanced, which of course confines the 
explanation that such fluctuations could be exclusively a result of changes in the underlying assets 
fundamental characteristics.  Swift advancements in the prices of assets over these condensed periods 
of time fuel the notion that assets are overvalued and an impending ‘correction’ in price is imminent. 
In 2005 The Economist stressed the inflationary risks of surging asset prices, which may distort price 
signals and thus encourage the misallocation of resources within an economy.  The examples provided 
entail the encouragement of too little savings, or too much investment in housing, Economist 
Newspaper Limited (2005).  With the advantage of hindsight this was a remarkably accurate 
assessment of the US economy which at the time was guilty of diverting disproportionate resources 
from their productive uses towards domestic real estate.    
Further, there are a vast number of empirical studies which indicate a correlation between asset 
bubbles and the introduction of less-seasoned market participants, one such study was that conducted 
by White (1990).  The underlying premise of these studies alludes to widespread euphoria amongst 
both professional market participant and less experienced participants.  The apparent ‘easy profits’ 
motivate otherwise impartial parties to undertake the ‘lucrative’ practice of purchasing equities, thus 
further fuelling asset price advances.  Several simulated academic experiments confirm this 
behaviour.  Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) conducted an experiment in which subjects were 
permitted to trade simulated assets.  Unambiguous data was provided regarding the respective assets 
dividends, and subjects (who were not necessarily professional investors) were provided individual 
motivation in the form of prospective profits to ensure their active participation. Given that the 
information communicated to all participants relating to the assets was identical, logic dictates that no 
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asset price bubble should have occurred.  Surprisingly the results of this study however depicted a 
typical asset bubble scenario, whereby prices rapidly elevated beyond objective fundamental levels, 
followed by a rapid price reversal.  This result serves to highlight the inherent danger of dislodged 
(from fundamental justification) and synchronised asset price valuations amongst unaccustomed 
market participants, effectively further contributing to the inflating of asset bubbles.  In contemplation 
of the study conducted by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), Barlevy (2007) provides an 
insightful observation.  Given the susceptibility of market participants to incorrectly determine an 
equities fundamental value, could the same potential vulnerability be present amongst policymakers?  
Certainly if this were to be the case, attempts to discourage asset prices inflating may run the risk of 
proving misguided and perhaps even counterproductive.  Assuming policymakers do possess a 
superior understanding of fundamental asset prices when compared to the average market participant, 
Barlevy (2007) highlights yet another potential hazard.  Supposing early signs of an asset bubble is 
confirmed by policymakers, who undertake the proactive measure of decreasing its market price.  
Surely under these circumstances market participants will simply accelerate their purchases, 
inevitably bidding the price up under speculative euphoria.  Perhaps one solution to this phenomenon 
might lie in the nature of the policyholders’ intervention.  By controlling the level of market liquidity 
(limiting the availability of credit) perhaps this unfavourable development can be restrained, a topic 
certainly deserving of further study.  Barlevy (2007) provides the more palatable solution of simply 
educating market participant as to the nature of an equities fundamental value, and their inherent 
nature to mean revert.  If deemed the most effective elucidation, it will be imperative that such 
education is conducted proactively.          
 
Liquidity and Asset Bubbles 
The possibility that asset prices may deviate from their intrinsic value based on market fundamentals 
has long intrigued economists.  If equity prices were relentlessly consistent with rational expectations 
of future dividends discounted by a constant rate, then prices could be expected to change only in the 
event of new information entering the market.  The arrival of this information would obviously be 
unpredictable, Samuelson (1965).  Rationality of prices would therefore imply equity price changes 
which take place in an unpredictable fashion, Camerer (1989).  Unpredictability however does not 
necessarily imply the presence of rationality.  Equity prices may indeed be unpredictable given the 
incorporation of all available information, however may also be subject to the influence of an 
unpredictable bubble component, Friedman (1984).    
The concept that asset prices may drift from intrinsic value and demonstrate bubble like tendencies 
has a long oral account among financial practitioners, especially non-economists. Macroeconomic 
theorists appear to have been the first to formalise the possibility of asset bubbles, sighting ‘dynamic 
models of the price level could have indeterminate explosive solutions even if agents have rational 
expectations’, Camerer (1989, p.4).  Theoretical considerations by Giese and Tuxen (2007) go further 
to identify the relationship between liquidity and asset prices on a global scale, namely: 
i) Liquidity may cause inflation if demand increases, given a static supply of assets  
ii) An economy experiencing growth may lead to both amplified liquidity and to a upswing 
in asset prices 
iii) Lower interest rates (due to increased liquidity) may result in equity price gains, due to 
the reduction in the discount factor 
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Allen and Gale (2000) provide a differing explanation regarding asset bubbles, noting three distinct 
phases.  The first phase is described as financial liberalisation, whereby a conscious decision by a 
domestic central bank is made to increase lending.  This expansion of credit is closely followed by an 
advance in asset prices (such as equities) as further demand filters into the economy and the bubble 
begins to inflate.  The second stage has been described as the precipitant mean reversion of asset 
prices i.e. the bubble bursts.  And finally the third phase is characterised by subsequent defaults by the 
institutions which participated in the purchasing of assets at inflated values, by abandoning prudent 
financial management. 
Broad evidence supports the existence of asset bubbles along with accompanying economic 
distortions, financial and real economic instability, Roubini (2006).  The germane question becomes 
whether monetary policy authorities in contemplation of policy should incorporate the effects of 
liquidity on asset price bubbles (i.e. target the bubble directly) beyond the influence that such bubbles 
may have on ancillary considerations, such as current output growth, inflation expectations, and 
aggregate spending.  As described by Roubini (2006), many including the Federal Reserve believe 
monetary policy should refrain from reacting to asset prices and potential bubbles beyond its direct 
effects on inflation, aggregate spending and economic growth.  Much like Roubini (2006) this thesis 
refutes the arguments against consideration of asset prices in the formulation of monetary policy to 
address potential bubbles. 
In the fall of 1996, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan cautioned of the ‘irrational 
exuberance’ clearly evidenced by the stock market valuations at the time, Greenspan (1996, Dec 5).  
Reviewing empirical actions undertaken by the Federal Reserve in reply to the surge in stock prices 
beyond that which was allegedly warranted by economic fundamentals during the 1990s provides 
support to this argument.  With the exception of a 25 basis point increase in the Federal funds rate in 
1997, the Federal Reserve remained committed to their policy of refraining from decreasing market 
liquidity despite evidence that an asset price bubble may be forming.  Similarly the Federal Reserve 
can be seen resisting the pre-emptive adjustment to monetary policy (thus market liquidity) during the 
years preceding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
Roubini (2006, p. 95) argues the necessity of a monetary policy which ‘should try to prick or burst 
asset bubbles’ by incorporating the monitoring of asset prices on a continuous basis.  Asset price 
bubbles permitted to evolve unchecked empirically have demonstrated the potential to grow large, 
leading to investment and economic distortions which pose a grave risk to financial stability once they 
become inevitably unsustainable.  ‘Thus, optimal monetary policy should pre-emptively deal with 
asset bubbles rather than just mop up the mess that they have caused after they burst’, Roubini (2006, 
p. 89). 
In contemplating practically how asset prices bubbles can be incorporated into monetary policy 
formulation mechanisms, the logical question then becomes how one could identify whether 
advancements in asset prices are justified by fluctuating economic fundamentals.  Tirole (1982, 1985) 
provided insight as to which specific asset classes might be prone to price bubbles.  Given the 
necessity of resale, assets would need to be durable in the sense that they are capable of maintaining 
value beyond a one owner.  Scarcity or short-run supply inelasticity is also important as the alternative 
would be an increase in supply in response to more favourable asset prices, introducing an early limit 
on price advances.  Assets require an active secondary market, and perhaps more ambiguously a 
mechanism for coordinating the belief that asset prices will continue to advance.  Upon inspection 
global equity markets appeared to satisfy each of these requirements (ignoring comparatively trivial 
initial public offerings) during the year preceding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
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Admittedly it is difficult to identify a non-fundamental asset price bubble with any degree of 
confidence.  It is this challenge which motivates advocates of monetary policy formulation which 
disregards asset price incorporation as superior such as Bernanke and Gertler (2001).   The inherent 
flaw in this argument is that ‘all economic policy decisions are based on some degree of uncertainty’, 
Roubini (2006, p.92).  Expanding on this observation the conceptual flaw of failing to recognise asset 
prices when formulating monetary policy due to the presence of uncertain characteristics implies that 
monetary policy is always implemented under conditions of certainty (such as data reliability), this 
however we know to be inaccurate. 
Once a degree of uncertainty regarding the identification and measurement of an asset bubble has 
been acknowledged the superior approach to asset price incorporation might perhaps be diluting the 
effects of its incorporation by a quantified level of uncertainty.  Perhaps given the uncertainty faced 
by policymakers in the practical implementation of monetary policy, effectiveness can be enhanced 
by introducing a coefficient to account for the presence of imperfect information, Brainard (1967).  
Filardo (2004) rationalises that the greater the uncertainty regarding the presence of an asset bubble 
the lower the coefficient will be on the asset price in the optimal monetary reaction function.  
Therefore the greater the uncertainty regarding the size of the asset bubble, the more muted the 
monetary policy response.  Another alternative could perhaps be for policymakers to follow a strategy 
of robust control, whereby relatively more attention is paid to the potential for downside risks (policy 
taking account of two sigma events).  However, to rigidly ignore the influence of asset price 
fluctuations altogether is neither optimal nor rational, Roubini (2006).  Caution however is warranted 
as the emergence of an asset bubble is likely to evidence structural delinquencies within an economy, 
grave foresight as to whether proposed actions will mitigate or exacerbate economic imperfections 
will be required. 
Numerous empirical observations that the majority of instances of increased liquidity resulting from 
the sustained increase in monetary supply fail to have led to equity booms does not invalidate the 
possibility of bubbles occurring.  Rather, what is relevant is the potential for post monetary 
accommodation bubbles, and how monetary policy authorities should react to them, Roubini (2006). 
Relationship between liquidity and asset prices 
The hallmark of an asset bubble appears to be when market participants acknowledge that prices are 
much higher than their intrinsic worth but continue to purchase the assets never the less undeterred, 
with their rationale dominated by the expectation that asset prices will continue to progress.  The 
provision of liquidity during periods of market distress assists in the alleviation of systematic risk by 
assuring market participants that, in the event of a loss of investor confidence, financial institutions 
are able to honour their obligations to creditors without relying on the sale of potentially destabilizing 
assets in a fire sale fashion, Bernanke (2009|A).  
While in many cases financial crises appear to have been precipitated by a shock (originating from the 
real economy) of some sort, there are however numerous documented instances whereby a financial 
crisis appears to have been triggered by an event in the financial sector.  Allen and Gale (2000) 
provide the example of financial liberalisation (of the capital account) and the associated expansion of 
credit being correlated to the surge in equity prices of emerging markets (increased capital inflows 
and credit feeding the bubble).  The then bloated asset prices are in turn supported by further 
anticipation of credit (more liquidity) and thus even grander prices.  The inevitable deviation from this 
cumulative progression ultimately may initiate a crisis.  Testament to this theory is the Japanese Crisis 
in the early 1990s.  Japan’s withdrawal of liquidity in 1990 through channels of credit tightening 
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precipitated the collapse of asset prices, marking the commencement of a prolonged real economic 
crisis (following an initial financial shock). 
Motives to participate in the inflation of an asset bubble are of particular concern amongst mutual 
funds.  Investors often judge the competence of professional money managers relative to the returns 
of competing professionals, this comparison more often than not places the bulk of the emphasis on 
returns.  During periods of rapidly advancing prices (bubbles) money managers are often left with 
little choice other than to obtain exposure to the booming asset(s), dampening the individual asset 
valuations required to ensure an efficient market.  If risk-averse money managers succeed in 
minimising the variance of their relative performance by conforming to broader market, holdings 
coordination will assist in sustaining the persistence of the ‘mispricing’.  Acquiring an investment 
allocation which varies from competing professionals under these conditions will likely increase 
relative performance risk, Camerer (1989).   
Policymakers have been slow to acknowledge a relationship between the management of liquidity and 
its undeniable influence on the price of assets.  At the heart of this intellectual struggle are attempts to 
overlook asset bubbles due to the fact that empirical research has found them to be arbitrary, as well 
as the academic challenge to rationalise the clearly evident possibility of their existence during times 
of economic distress.  Despite the absence of a uniform explanation of how expansive monetary 
policy (thus a surge in liquidity) will affect asset prices, the correlation is undisputed.  From a 
theoretical perspective consider central bank dictated declines in interest rates.  The central bank 
makes lending more affordable for financial institutions; therefore base rate declines will irrefutably 
be accompanied by a uniform decline in depositor interest rates.  Subsequent liquidity excess 
circulating the market will find little incentive to commit to this new uninspiring depositor rate.  With 
expansive monetary policy fuelling inflationary concerns, investors seeking real wealth preservation 
may to be enticed to invest in overly speculative equities or perhaps the bond market. Negative real 
returns on money market investments offered by financial institutions therefore provide an 
undesirable investment prospect.  The uncertainty surrounding the sustainability of financial 
institutions in the event of a financially rooted crisis (such as the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) can be 
seen to exacerbate the lack of desire of market participants to hold their wealth in riskier institutions 
offering parsimonious returns.   
Figure 13 below provides graphical evidence of the observed correlation between increased liquidity 
and asset price recoveries following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  With the Federal Reserve 
committing to a policy of prolonged depressed interest rates, excess market liquidity (resulting from 
the first two Quantitative Easing programmes) can be perceived as the primary contributor to asset 
price recoveries.  For purposes of objectivity the safe haven status of US Treasury bonds during 
periods of economic distress should however also be noted.  
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Empirical observations prior to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis provides abundant evidence of 
several crises preceded by asset bubbles.  Giese and Tuxen (2007) provided evidence of ‘unusually 
loose’ monetary policy in the years preceding the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, culminating into a 
global liquidity surplus - defined as money in excess of Gross Domestic Product - and ultimately 
inflated asset prices.  Principal concern in the years to follow 2008 should remain focused on the 
perils of liquidity in equity and bond markets, and more particularly the resultant bubble like 
characteristics evident in global equity and bond markets resulting from an accommodative monetary 
policy which fails to make provisions for the non-fundamental renewed equity and bond price highs.  
Monetary policy whilst not a silver bullet which may be used as a customary measure to address asset 
bubbles may however possess an authoritative influence which may be used to avoid a prolonged 
economic crisis.  Roubini (2006) stopped short of advocating an aggressive monetary policy approach 
to asset bubbles, suggesting rather monetary policy respond to bubbles in a cautious and moderate 
manner, an insightful recommendation certainly worthy of further deliberation. 
Limitations of liquidity 
Acknowledging the effectiveness of liquidity as a remedial measure to remedy an economic 
contraction, our interest shifts to whether this liquidity response may possess limitations.  That is, is 
an increase in liquidity (resultant from Quantitative Easing) destined to be succeeded by superficially 
inflated asset prices posing the risk of a renewed recession?  Central bankers are in need of an 
inventive approach to gauge the perils of excessive liquidity, which leverages off public financial 
market observations to gauge acceptable levels of asset valuation.  Adding to the already problematic 
challenge of gauging the relationship between liquidity and asset prices is the observation that the 
financing of purchases (and thus demand) in many instances is not directly derived from the 
availability of liquidity.  Asset purchases such as equities may and often are funded through a myriad 
of financial products (for example leverage type contracts).  
Acknowledging the correlation between liquidity and asset prices, what becomes imperative is the 
resolve to predefine a limitation to the artificially inflated levels of liquidity.  In this case we are less 
concerned with the merits of increasing money supply (and liquidity) succeeding a crisis, but rather 
argue for a more symmetric response to rising and deflating asset prices to encourage the appropriate 
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balanced risk recognition by investors.  According to Roubini (2006) there may indeed be 
circumstantial evidence that dealing asymmetrically with bubbles causes more bubbles to emerge, as 
witnessed in equity valuations subsequent to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (see figure 13 above).  
An asymmetric response serves only to further inflate asset bubbles and deepen cycles.  Studies 
conducted by the Bank for International Settlements accentuate the need for further symmetry over 
the business cycle; alternatively a building up of financial imbalances may pose a threat to future 
price stability, Borio (2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The primary objective of demand-side stabilization is to flatten the business cycle depicted in figure 
14 above.  Less volatile periods of recession and recovery are characteristic of projected gyrations 
proving less vigorous.  Given a flatter business cycle the planning horizon for the private sector 
becomes more stable, long-term capital investments (and thus economic growth) theoretically 
flourishes under such circumstances. 
A further limitation to crisis liquidity committed responses is the effect of monetary policy 
incorporating asset prices on investor psychology, which by nature is notoriously unpredictable.  
Investor psychology in response to monetary policy however appears deserving of further 
independent research.  Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman provided valuable insight into the limitations of 
liquidity as a homogeneous remedy for the 2008 Global Financial Crisis; ‘many believe that all that 
we have is a liquidity crisis that can be undone with a bit of financial engineering.  This is a bad 
analysis, bad policy, and terrible politics’, Krugman (2009). 
Research suggests the asymmetric response of increasing liquidity (money supply), to offset the 
correction of asset price excess, serves to encourage financial institution risk taking.  As seen in the 
repercussion of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis banks becoming overly dependent on central bank 
funding, often exhibit reduced incentives for business model reform.  By maintaining pressure on 
financial institutions to address their structural faults, there should be no ambiguity about the short-
term nature of emergency liquidity.  According to Weidmann (2012|A), ‘to overcome the 2008 crisis, 
short-term measures have to be consistent with long-term stability’. 
Conventional economics dictates that aggressive monetary policy runs the risk of stoking inflation.  
Observing the events which preceded the 2008 Global Financial Crisis these concerns intensified as 
inflation reached alarmingly high levels in mid-2008.   
Figure: 14 – Theoretical Business Cycles 
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Fortunately this appears merely a reflection of a surge in the price of oil and other commodities which 
soon after reversed.  Prudent monetary policy and fiscal alignment remains essential to the alleviation 
of upside risks to inflation.  Unstable inflation as a result of excessive money supply (liquidity) 
creates uncertainties that inhibit economic decision making and thus investment, which ultimately 
encourages social dissatisfaction.  The excessive erosion of purchasing power of nominal income 
serves to negatively impact citizen’s general standard of living, and further stands to dilute citizens’ 
sustainability in retirement (adversely affecting the real value of pension income).  Inflation 
exceeding a certain level will surely be accompanied by calls for stabilization. This may entail large 
costs in lost output, as the priority of economic policy shifts towards an inflation appeasing effort. 
 
IV. Deficit Financing  
With the exception of a few limited scenarios, a country which incurs a current account deficit will 
simultaneously experience an offsetting capital account surplus.  Assuming a static official 
settlements account, the linear function of the current and capital account will equal zero.   
According to Balance-of-payments accounting this relationship can be depicted by the following 
equation: 
current account + capital account + official settlements account = 0 
 
Faced with the necessity of funding a current account deficit (through the capital account) three 
options are available to a government: 
i. Foreign and domestic borrowing  
ii. Debt repudiation (default) 
iii. Monetization 
Upon first observation, the possibility of foreign borrowing to fund a current account deficit appears 
extremely convenient.  Not only does a country benefit from the funding of its current account deficit, 
but capital inflows from foreign investment serve to suppress domestic interest rates (long-term 
interest rates/bond yields).  The logical question then becomes: how is this practise sustainable?  
Theoretically this practice is viable; however there are definite limitations to this form of deficit 
funding mechanism.  Langdana (2002) describes a sustainable bond-financed deficit as one which is 
capable of being rolled over indefinitely.  Under this explanation when government bonds mature, 
new bonds are simply issued to refinance existing debts.  So long as the inflationary adjusted yield of 
these bonds is less than the growth rate of the economy, the deficit is theoretically sustainable.   
Figure: 15 – US Inflation in 2008 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics  
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The inferences of limitations now become apparent, when the current account deficit (assuming it is 
government budget deficit driven) is observed as exceeding investors demand for government debt, 
the deficit becomes unsustainable.  Causes for the diminishing investor demand may be numerous, 
including rampant inflation, economic crisis, a lack of faith in government, etc.  Current observations 
of Greece’s economic woes provide a meaningful example of investors diminishing desire to hold 
Greek sovereign debt, primarily as a result of a lack of faith in the Greek government as well as 
repercussions of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  Beneath this undesirable dynamic a country 
experiencing an unfunded current account deficit may (where possible) find it necessary to embark on 
the practise of monetisation.  Intuitively the interest on government debt at this point will likely 
exceed the growth rate of the country’s economy.  In the event where monetization is not possible, 
such as within the European Union, alternative measures may include various degrees of austerity 
(reduced government spending and increased burden of taxation). 
Under monetization central banks increase the supply of money and intensify purchases of 
outstanding government debt, this is termed the monetizing of government deficit.  Whilst the 
attractiveness of this practice is apparent, inflation and hyperinflation bear testament to the limitations 
of rampant monetization.  According to Langdana (2002) a loose rule for G7 economies is that 
sustainability implies a budget deficit-to-GDP ratio of no greater than 5%.  Thus ensuring that deficits 
are funded by economic growth rather than monetization.  Perhaps even more stringent is the criterion 
of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty which defined the qualifying criteria for admission into the European 
Monetary Union.  Under this accord countries applying for admission were required to observe a 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio of no greater than 3% (and a public debt cap limited to 60%).   
Given the events which followed the 2008 Global Financial Crisis these benchmarks appear to have 
been largely neglected, especially given our new-found knowledge of the various fiscal fractures 
amongst European Monetary Union members.  Figure 16 depicts the broad based (with the exception 
of emerging economies) increase in global debt-to-GDP following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
however these regionally aggregated totals provide little insight into the immense challenges faced 
particularly by several sub-set members of the European Union.  Scrutiny of the sustainability of the 
European Monetary Union soon becomes apparent by isolating troubled members debt-to-GDP levels 
(see figure 17).   The combined average debt-to-GDP level for these seven troubled European states in 
2009 was an alarming 8.8%, nearly three times the accepted maximum for admission into the 
European Monetary Union.         
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Perhaps even more distressing than these European Union member’s escalating debt-to-GDP levels, is 
their inability to monetise government debt to alleviate short-term economic pressures. European 
Union members are characterised in part by a common currency, the Euro, which exists under the 
restrained mandate of the European Central Bank, annulling any possibility of monetizing debt on an 
individual country basis.  As an observed repercussion to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis these 
severely indebted countries have little choice but to commit to measures of austerity.  Whilst 
gradually introduced austerity measures are imperative for most countries experiencing unsustainable 
account deficits, the timing of these judicious efforts should be coordinated with the recommencing of 
a robust economic growth trend.  Attempts to reign in government spending during period of 
economic distress will do little other than to sabotage already fragile recovery efforts (the debt 
overhang effect). 
European Union construction appears to have succeeded admirably in integrating monetary policy by 
assimilating differentiated monetary practices towards the shared vision of a cohesive European 
Union, and common currency.  As revealed by the most recent euro-zone crisis however, fiscal 
actions are so closely aligned with monetary implications that problems affecting the one will 
undeniably be transmitted promptly to the other. Intentional monetary parallels have nevertheless 
been eclipsed by the apparent absence of fiscal coordination (failure of member countries to abide by 
the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact), a defect which now threatens the fate of a united Europe. 
Debts of emerging market economies have in contrast traditionally enjoyed sustainable demand from 
investors despite higher budget deficit-to-GDP ratios.  With global bond markets having recently 
endured the severe stresses stemming from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, financial theorists now 
have practical evidence refuting their antiquated believe that demand for sovereign debt is privy only 
to low deficit-to-GDP regions.  America in 2012 was noted as having borrowed from bond markets at 
a cheaper rate than at any time in the history of the republic, Economist Newspaper Limited (2012|A).  
Investor’s evident credibility concerns following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis appear to have 
motivated an investment temperament which prioritises the ‘return of capital, not necessarily the 
return on capital’.   The overwhelming desire of investors for safety tends to have inundated their 
concerns over the long-term health of the US economy.  The US therefore in many ways has become 
the beneficiary of disastrous global economic conditions, possessing the unique ability to purchase 
real goods and services from abroad in exchange for extremely low yielding debt obligations.  
Boasting the desirable quality of being the most liquid asset in the world, US Treasury bills (as well as 
bonds) have exhibited an unrivalled acceptance amid dire economic news.  Remarkably, this is true 
notwithstanding the bad news related to US government finances.  According to an article featured in 
The Economist, US Treasury bond yields were witnessed to have declined (rather than increased) 
following the once inconceivable downgrading of the US credit rating by Standard & Poor’s in 
August 2011, Economist Newspaper Limited (2012|A). 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis Economics – Perilous Liquidity | Master of Management in Finance & Investment   
 
35 | P a g e  
 
Steven Schultz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Deleveraging 
Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis many countries have been left with an enormous burden 
of debt, threatening the already strained prospect of a sustainable economic recovery.   
After having provided a comprehensive 
account of the actions undertaken by global 
central banks to alleviate both financial and 
economic pressures from the beginning of the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis to the time of 
writing, mounting pressures to deleverage 
government balance sheets should be 
intuitive. The neighbouring illustration 
demonstrates the perpetual US Federal debt 
accumulation witnessed over the past 30 
years. 
After having come to terms with the initial shocks of the economic crisis, the pertinent question then 
becomes one of the optimal deleveraging of government and central banks’ balance sheets.   In 
addressing this widespread challenge it is preferential to assess the sustainability of leverage and the 
process of deleveraging beyond the implications derived simply by the, at times misleading, debt-to-
GDP ratios of an economy. These debt-to-GDP ratios - when considered in isolation - fail to concede 
contrasting vulnerabilities of fundamentally different regions.  Accepting the strategic contribution 
that bank lending to residential mortgages played in setting the scene for the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, economists may ask questions of region-specific levels of debt in this sector prior to the recent 
economic fallout.  Work by Lund and Roxburgh (2010) reveals that by 2007 UK bank lending for 
residential mortgages was equivalent to 81% of the country’s annual GDP, with the US similarly 
exposed at 73%.  Figure 20 below assists in accentuating the extensive increases in both private and 
public domestic debt over the past twenty years. 
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A study of the above illustration, whilst admittedly limited to only a few developed economies, 
provides little perspective on the intrinsic dangers of escalating levels of debt within an economy.  
Empirical observations dating back to the Second World War do however produce evidence of 
lengthy and often painful periods of deleveraging following economic crises.  In the context of current 
global governments’ debt levels the daunting challenge of deleveraging, as well as the mechanisms 
available to do so, remain authoritative in acquiring a sustainable economic solution.   Swelling real 
estate prices along with increasing equity markets (which are regularly marked-to-market) assisted in 
concealing steep upsurges in leverage, as household debt-to-assets ratios remained stable in the years 
preceding the crisis, Lund and Roxburgh (2010).  Relatively low levels of interest (bank lending rates) 
in developed markets further contributed to the masking of increasing unsustainable levels of 
household debt.  The trend evident in the illustration above does well to summarise an imperative 
point; advanced economies have demonstrated a clear tendency to increasing leverage relative to GDP 
over the past decade.   
 
In contrast to households, government debt relative to GDP remained stable in the decade preceding 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  In the US, for example, the ratio of government debt to GDP was 
witnessed to have declined by an annual rate of roughly 2%, this despite having subsidised wars in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Similar trends were observed in Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, however 
the ratio of government debt to GDP rose slightly in Germany, Canada, France, and the UK, Lund and 
Roxburgh (2010).  
This disciplined government budget was later to prove a defining factor in recessionary response 
flexibility following the outbreak of the impending crisis.  Unprecedented action following the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis has seen a dramatic transferring of this debt onto the balance sheets of 
governments and central banks around the globe.   
 
Figure 20: Debt Growth Accelerated in the Majority of Mature Economies 
Domestic private and public sector debt¹ by country % of GDP 
Notes: 
1 - ‘Debt’ is defined as all credit market borrowing including loans and fixed-income securities. 
2 - Compound annual growth rate. Where data is available, the longest possible period is used. 
3 - Even after removing foreign lending by UK banks, UK debt/GDP remains higher than every country except Japan. 
 
 Source: Central banks; Haver Analytics, McKinsey Global Institute – Illustration reproduced from McKinsey World Economics, Vol. 11, No.2, April – June 2010 
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Economic consequences of deleveraging 
Following the outbreak of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, government borrowing surged in many 
countries to finance unprecedented recession-related stimulus programmes and financial sector 
bailouts.  Whilst a return to nominal growth in GDP in many developed regions is currently 
underway, evidence of the sustainability of this trend remains questionable. Stubborn aftershocks 
following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis appear persistent at the time of writing; leaving calls for 
government debt reduction disregarded as premature.    
Returning to the comprehensive work of Lund and Roxburgh (2010), abundant empirical evidence 
suggests that the deleveraging of government balance sheets is imminent.  Defining significant 
deleveraging as where debt-to-GDP declines for at least three consecutive years and falls by 10% or 
more, Lund and Roxburgh (2010) identify 45 such episodes since the 1930s through to June 2010.  
Having cross-referenced these periods of deleveraging with the documented work of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), every significant financial crisis during the period under study has been followed by a 
period of deleveraging (with the exception of Japan).  The undeniable significance of this observation 
allows us to analyse the prospects of an impending deleveraging with a great degree of empirical 
support. 
According to research conducted by Lund and Roxburgh (2010), empirical post-crisis evidence 
suggests that the process of deleveraging tends to last an average of six to seven years and produce a 
debt-to-GDP median reduction of roughly 25%.  Fascinatingly, they found that deleveraging typically 
commenced two years after the inception of the financial crisis and economic recession.  Lund and 
Roxburgh (2010) noted that in the vast majority of cases GDP growth declined in the early years of 
the deleveraging, only to rebound in the next four to five years while deleveraging persevered.  Early 
evidence suggests the post 2008 Global Financial Crisis deleveraging will be unique in this regard, 
given the vast scale of deleveraging which is required. 
 
 
‘Belt-tightening’  
Most common deleveraging path 
 
‘High inflation’ 
Absence of strong central banks, 
often in emerging markets 
 
‘Massive default’  
Often after a currency crisis 
 
‘Growing out of debt’ 
Often after an oil or war boom 
 
Total 
Notes: 
1 – Deleveraging driven by off-trend growth is not linked to a recession. 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, McKinsey Global Institute analysis  
Illustration reproduced from McKinsey World Economics, Vol. 11, No.2, April – June 2010 
Figure 21: Real GDP growth is significantly slower in the first 2-3 years of deleveraging 
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Impact of deleveraging on GDP growth 
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Whilst the study above provides a valuable framework within which to contemplate the implications 
of government deleveraging following the initial outbreak of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 
differing rudiments of modern day influences need to be taken into consideration.  The majority of 
crises witnessed in Lund and Roxburgh’s (2010) empirical study were incidents isolated by 
geographical region, therefore reliant on the supposition that countries could deleverage whilst 
simultaneously boosting exports.  In the case of the current crisis few countries have been spared from 
the extreme repercussions.  Given the increasing degree of global integration witnessed over the past 
decade, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is distinctive in its ability to transcend borders.  Adding to 
the challenge of a sustainable recovery is the fact that contagion has not been limited to smaller global 
economies, but rather has been characterised by an indiscriminate transmission to large and smaller 
economies alike.    
Post-2008 Global Financial Crisis developments in advanced economies are of particular concern, as 
several governments (particularly in Europe) are experiencing ever increasing political pressure for a 
rapid deleveraging of government debt.  Given the anaemic growth (at best) in these regions 
economic recoveries have reached the point of being derailed.   Whilst the task of deleveraging 
governments’ balance sheets remains irrefutable, Krugman and Layard (2012) accuse advocates of 
hasty deleveraging policies as having misconstrued the purpose of fiscal policy during depressed 
economic conditions.  Justly argued is that fiscal policy should play a stabilising role until such time 
as economic normality resumes, and should not ‘reinforce the dampening effects of private-sector 
spending cuts’. 
Whilst the future of an integrated Europe remains uncertain, palatable arguments for a sustainable 
recovery appear to advocate governments refraining from deleveraging until the recovery is 
confirmed to have taken hold.  This view is in line with traditional Keynesian advocates.  Despite the 
maintenance of higher government debt-to-GDP ratios amplifying a countries vulnerability to further 
economic shocks (for example higher interest rates), the prospect of impulsive deleverage poses even 
greater risks.  A number of empirical examples, from the US in 1938 to Japan in 1997, confirm the 
perils of a premature withdrawal of fiscal and monetary support from a fragile economy.  However, 
given the alternate prospect of compounding already excessive government levels of debt leaves little 
political flexibility in many euro-zone member countries other than government spending discipline. 
Bernanke (2009|A) argues against the necessity of hastily deleveraging the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet.  Theoretically many acknowledge that by expanding the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet (i.e. 
Quantitative Easing) one effectively undertakes the practice of printing money, and thus provoking 
inflation.  Bernanke point out that much of the Federal Reserve’s lending activities to financial 
institutions can be accounted for by a substantial increase in the excess reserves held by banks.  Given 
the noted preference of banks in holding these bulk reserves idle (in most cases on deposit with the 
Federal Reserve), the rate of broader monetary aggregate growth is diluted.  The risk of rampant 
inflation is further relaxed as weak global economic activity and the suppression of commodity prices 
remains persistent in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
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Another theoretical interpretation which may warrant reinvestigation is whether a rise in inflation will 
in fact derail an economic recovery at all.  Shifting away from conventional inflationary fears leads us 
to question whether a temporarily higher-than-normal level of inflation could perhaps assist in 
facilitating wage and price adjustments as well as erode the real value of household debt?  Further 
when nominal interest rates have reached zero, a higher inflation rate corresponds directly to a lower 
(and even further stimulating) real interest rate.  In stark contracts to this reasoning, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank argues against higher inflation proving beneficial, and instead advocating a strong 
preference for stability-orientated monetary policy, Weidmann (2012|B). 
Faced with widespread taxpayer apprehension of the measures executed in response to the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis, Bernanke (2009|B) adamantly defends the actions undertaken by the Federal 
Reserve as being in the best interests of all stakeholders.  The transactions undertaken by the Federal 
Reserve to prevent the systematically destabilizing failures of Bear Stearns and AIG admittedly carry 
more risk than the Federal Reserve’s traditional activities.  However it is anticipated by the Federal 
Reserve that upon the sale of these assets taxpayers returns will be maximised, and any credit 
extended will be recovered.  Bernanke goes on to emphasise that the assets under scrutiny are interest 
bearing and thus the implied increase in interest can be viewed as beneficial to the Federal budget.  
According to Bernanke ‘from the point of view of the Federal government, the Federal Reserve’s 
activities do not imply greater expenditure or indebtedness’.  Whilst factually correct, the intention 
distorts policymaker credibility. 
Whilst the innate characteristics of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis may have alleviated the need for 
a rapid deleveraging of the Federal Reserve balance sheet, at some point the numerous and unnatural 
(emergency) lending programmes will have to be unwound.  Expectations of the events that will 
eventually trigger this policy transformation are likely to be evidence of a sustainable and robust 
recovery in both credit markets and the economy at large, with actions undertaken by the Federal 
Reserve to unwind its balance sheet closely resembling monetary and fiscal tightening.  Bernanke 
(2009|A) describes the process under which normality will be restored at the Federal Reserve, upon 
which time it will resume its traditional considerations in making monetary policy, identifying a target 
for the Federal funds rate.  Accordingly it is expected that a significant shrinking of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet can be accomplished rapidly as it commences the scaling back of assets 
which it holds.  Given the short-term nature of many of these assets, for instance loans to financial 
institutions, currency swaps, and purchases of commercial paper, the Federal Reserve will simply be 
able to allow these asset to ‘run off’ their balance sheet as they mature.  Longer term investments are 
expected to be disposed of gradually as confirmation of the economic recovery and renewed investor 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Advanced economies European Union Major advanced economies (G7) Emerging economies
In
fl
at
io
n
 (
%
) 
Forecast 
Data source: International Monetary Fund 
Figure 22: Global Inflation Projections 
Crisis Economics – Perilous Liquidity | Master of Management in Finance & Investment   
 
40 | P a g e  
 
Steven Schultz 
demand takes hold.  The vast majority of mortgage backed securities acquired by the Federal Reserve 
under the third round of Quantitative Easing are likely to constitute longer term investments.  
Upon reestablishment of financial normality central banks will likely find favour in their lacklustre 
duty of setting reserve requirements (in conjunction with the setting the Federal funds rate) given the 
on-going pursuit of economic stability.  Reserve requirements as well as the quality of assets 
acceptable to be used as reserves, have an augmentative effect on the level of liquidity available in an 
economy.  
Regardless of which points find favour with the reader one thing appears undeniable, deleveraging 
once commenced will likely dampen GDP growth, decelerating an already uninspiring recovery.  
According to a study conducted by the International Monetary Fund where 173 cases of government 
budget cuts were analysed, the consistent result was an economic contraction, Krugman and Layard 
(2012).  This result comes as no surprise when observing copious examples of contracting European 
countries following crisis-induced austerity measures.  It is therefore vital that policies remain aligned 
and avoid the risk of a tightened economic cycle.  Policymakers if to be successful will find it 
imperative to exploit policy synergies (allied monetary and fiscal policies) in returning to growth, and 
face grave challenges in placing economic priorities above politics. 
 
VI. Geographic Considerations 
Economic fundamentals differ vastly by geographic region; failure to acknowledge these contrasts 
renders our perception of global economic dynamics deficient.  Differences vary immensely 
dependent not only on geographic location, but also on less tangible considerations such as exchange 
controls, perceived credibility amongst investors, the political environment, professed risk, and the 
sophistication of a country’s financial system to name but a few.   Whilst the discretion of each of 
these differences in redundant for the purposes of this research, there is merit in accentuating a few 
differences so far as their potential influence on asset bubbles. 
Asymmetric Information  
A noteworthy consideration when investing in emerging markets is the disreputable lack of uniformity 
of information.  Weaker market efficiency even in the absence of internal optimism may be capable of 
stimulating asset bubbles.  Elaborating on this concept, let us assume market participants are in 
agreement that asset prices are far in excess of that implied by intrinsic justification.  Under such 
conditions all market participants will anticipate a future price decline; however each participant is 
unaware of whether other market participants have identified the same outcome.  Market participants 
continue to partake in the generous returns exacerbating the price bubble.  Intuitively this 
unsustainable approach will conclude with one inauspicious market participant being the owner of the 
asset when the bubble bursts, Camerer (1989). Assuming a limited number of market participants 
willing to participate in this practice, the ‘last person in line’ will decline to purchase the distended 
asset, forcing the holder of the asset to endure significant losses.  
Central Bank Transparency 
The extent of central bank transparency (and to similar measure credibility) may prove detrimental to 
market participants managing investment strategies ‘vigilant’ of asset price bubbles.  Uncertainty 
surrounding central bank policies on credit expansion and liquidity, as well as a lack of independence 
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may lead to substantial deviations in asset prices from their fundamental values.  These adverse 
characteristics, often synonymous with emerging markets have empirically been concluded as the root 
cause of severe financial crises.   
Population Growth 
A consideration perhaps somewhat peculiar upon first glance; however a country’s population growth 
is irrefutably interrelated with a country’s fiscal rigidity.  Consider two countries both characterised 
by an alarming obligation of debt.  Further let us assume that while both economies are similar in 
every respect with one prominent contrast; the one country possesses on average a young population 
with high fertility rates, whilst the second an older average population with less vigorous levels of 
fertility.  Whilst perhaps overly simplified, the economic consequence is ostensible, the higher the 
projected population growth the greater the number of future tax payers (ceteris paribus). A favourite 
amongst emerging market prejudiced investment strategists is the argument of the generational effect.  
Theoretically under the generational effect competitive countries characterised by the prospect of a 
rapidly expanding workforce (admirable population growth) are capable of maintaining much higher 
levels of government debt (as opposed to their stagnant peers) due to their superior future taxation 
revenues.  There is certainly a necessity for further future studies based on empirical observations of 
emerging Asian economies during the late 1990s which are likely to add credibility to this theory.   
A less controversial secondary effect of excessive population growth is the strain placed on resource 
accessibility.  Thriving future populations will undoubtedly be accompanied by increased demand for 
agriculture, energy, metals, and other minerals.  Investment strategists have been quick to note the 
imminent shifting of capital to resource blessed regions.  With Africa a unique natural resource net 
producer already having been labelled as a ‘new frontier’ for investors.  Whether emerging markets 
such as Africa can transform these capital inflows into longer term wealth remains a controversial 
debate.  This debate to a large extent highlights the economic deficiencies which often characterised 
emerging markets, for example; corruption, suboptimal allocation of resources, inadequate 
infrastructure, scarcity of skilled labour, and capital markets which are often difficult to access.     
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Figure 23: Global Population Projections 
Source: Financial Times, UN Population Division 
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With a global population now in excess of seven billion and growing by approximately 76 million 
people per year, a discussion of geographic dynamics would be incomplete without the 
consideration of the economic consequences of this population trajectory.  Adopting a scientific 
approach (and intentionally avoiding apocalyptic predictions) it took human history from first 
record up until the 20
th
 century to reach a population of two billion; however it is now projected 
that the achievement of the next two billion will take little more than the next forty years, Fortune 
Magazine (2011). 
The relevance of emerging markets in this observation relates to the phenomena of regionally 
segregated fertility levels.  According to Cookson (2011), emerging markets such as Africa and the 
Middle East demonstrate fertility levels far in excess of their developed market counterparts. 
According to the UN population division this trend will likely persist as low-fertility countries 
which at present account for roughly 42% of the world population are failing to be succeeded by 
children who will survive to child bearing age. In contrast high fertility countries are on average 
producing in excess of two children per household, with a particular concentration in Africa.   
There appears to be a strong correlation between high fertility rates and poverty (attributable in 
large to a lack of female education), Cookson (2011). 
The above findings are echoed by recent research conducted by the Economist Newspaper Limited 
(2012|B).  This research finds a clear correlation between post crisis European countries and the 
decline in family formation (and thus reproduction).  Another identified trend focuses on the 
postponement of childbirth as a result of external influences, known by demographers as the 
“tempo” effect.  According to this study in 1970 the age at which most Western European woman 
desired to have their first child was between 22 and 25.  In 2008 it was between 27 and 29.  If this 
observation is considered to hold merit it would appear that European fertility is far more 
susceptible to government policy than their emerging neighbours.  In 2006 woman surveyed in 
Niger were confirmed to desire an average of 9.1 children each, undeterred by external influences. 
Two actualities remain irrefutable, firstly emerging markets population growth will continue to 
progress in excess of their developed peers, and with an ever increasing global population demand 
for raw-materials can be anticipated to follow suit.  Whilst admittedly ignorant to global 
sustainability projections, emerging markets if able to advance the level of their populations’ 
education, stand to benefit the most from global rebalancing and monetary policy flexibility. 
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Even under the most optimistic projections the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is sure to leave a costly 
legacy.  As depicted in figure 24 below average debt-to-GDP ratios remains a vital area of concern.  
In the absence of growth it would appear reasonable to anticipate these ratios continue to exacerbate.  
Perhaps this provides an opaque depiction of the comparative fate of developed economies to their 
growing emerging peers.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These immense levels of debt will unavoidably call for vast deviation between emerging and 
advanced economies in interest payments and tax revenue collection, with signs of such burdens 
already taking their toll on several European economies.  Perhaps the largest challenge once global 
output levels have stabilised, will be how to return government debt back to acceptable levels.  This is 
unlikely to be a painless and politically unproblematic progression. 
 
Global Capital Flows 
In the context of this research, of particular concern is the shifting of short-term global flows of funds 
witnessed during periods of significant financial distress, and perhaps most importantly the ability of 
these flows to exacerbate the financial pressure exerted on an emerging market economy.   
Typically a hot capital flow has been designated as capital with origin in an advanced economy, 
which has been invested in an emerging economy with the primary motive of speculation (portfolio 
flows).  Unfortunately given the often short-term nature of these investment flows, hot capital can at 
times most accurately be classified as a macroeconomic liability.  Whilst many would argue that 
given periods of current account deficits, a country should welcome this much needed capital inflow,it 
rarely arrives on the shores of economies upon their instruction.  Consider the events which unfolded 
during the 1990s in Southern Asia, all recipients of these hot capital flows demonstrated current 
account surpluses (with the exception of Indonesia).  Not only did this region enjoy the absence of a 
deficit to finance, the region further boasted a low unemployment rate and an oversupply of 
manufacturing goods and capital investments (automobiles, electronics, etc).   
Despite the apparent self-sustaining characteristics in Southern Asia during the 1990s, market 
participants looking to participate in the inspiring growth in the region injected significant speculative 
investment into the region.  Financial markets in the region began to overheat with prices of equities 
and real-estate climbing to astronomical levels.  In the midst of an evident bubble inflating in the 
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region, Western Europe began to show promising signs conducive for investment.  The sudden and 
fatal exodus of capital towards restored European investment prospects left Southern Asian 
economies financially traumatised. 
The abrupt flight of hot capital causes long-term interest rates to increase sharply, resulting in 
borrowing costs becoming prohibitive.  Furthermore, as foreign speculators raced to discharge 
speculative investments the domestic currencies collapsed.  Imports became unaffordable as the 
currency got progressively weaker, fuelling increases in inflation.  Finally the economic symptoms 
culminated with a terminal weakening of confidence, Langdana (2002).  Worthy of mention is the 
remarkably prudent monetary policy of Singapore during this period, which contributed largely to the 
avoidance of the Singaporean currency meltdown.  Singaporean policymakers pegged their domestic 
dollar to a basket of currencies (with the US dollar a major component) as a defensive precaution 
during this period.  Under this currency structure the Singaporean economy demonstrated admirable 
resilience to temperamental outflows.  
Emerging markets quick to learn from the disruptions of Southern Asia designed mechanisms to 
discourage such hot capital inflows and the destabilising volatility which accompanies it.  China for 
example has restricted the purchasing of its A-type equities by foreign investors.  Whilst the 
intolerance of foreign speculative investment in China is evident, long-term inflows aimed at capital 
and infrastructure spending continue to be encouraged.       
Superior growth prospects in many emerging economies along with the low interest rate environments 
in developed regions appear to be a primary contributor to the resurgence of capital flows to emerging 
economies.  It is this very portfolio flow which warrants close scrutiny given the ever present risk of 
inflationary pressures and asset bubbles. 
 
Chapter Three – Insights of Research 
 
The intention of this research is to elaborate on the economic intuition behind technical theory and 
elusive empirical observations.  The objectives can be listed as follows: 
i) To formulate a conceptual framework to assist in the identification of asset price bubbles. 
ii) Conduct a post-crisis economic assessment of Sub-Saharan Africa, along with a multiple 
regression gross domestic product forecast for the region. 
iii) Hypothesise a generic stress test methodology which can be utilised to ascertain 
individual country risk. 
 
 
Purpose of Study 
To date there have been a number of studies which are complementary to that contained in this 
research.  However there are three main theoretical innovations which have been explored in this 
paper, namely: 
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I. Identification of Asset Bubbles  
The theory of asset bubbles and the prerequisite conditions under which such bubbles might occur 
appear at present fairly conclusive.  However this is less true for empirical tests which continue to 
produce discrepancies when verified under practical experiences.  This research attempts to explore 
means of identifying prospective asset bubbles. 
 
Equity Correlation 
With equity prices becoming increasing susceptible to the ebb and flow of market participants’ 
expectations of the economic environment, one can’t help but wonder why so little research has been 
conducted regarding whether market fear can be gauged by the observed correlation among equities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst the concept of investor herding during times of both extreme market fear and abundant 
exuberance is broadly accepted, the ability to credibly gauge the effect of irrational market sentiment 
on price behaviour would provide a superior understanding of how to gauge market excess.  Equities 
in theory should experience random price fluctuations based on ever changing company fundamentals 
(Random Walk Hypothesis).  Practically however, we know this assumption to fail dramatically 
during periods of market crises.  Massive investor deleveraging motivated by panic selling followed 
by alternating waves of purchase by investors anticipating a trough has been reached, results in 
heightened volatility and high levels of correlation between individual equities.  According to Demos 
(2011) the correlation between the largest 250 equities in the S&P 500 during the market correction of 
2011 demonstrated similar levels of correlation as those observed in the equity market crash of 1987.  
In 1987 correlation on the S&P 500 (largest 250 companies) was seen to have peaked at 88 per cent.  
The historical average is roughly 30 per cent.  This raises questions of the ability of equity correlation 
to predict investor herding behaviour at the expense of overlooking equity fundamentals.  It stands 
oddly coincidental that the build-up finally culminated on the notorious black Monday of 1987 where 
a 22 per cent decline in the Dow Jones Industrial average was observed remains the highest daily 
correlation on record.  Questions must also be asked of whether this explanatory tool is capable of 
gauging both irrational exuberance as well as apocalyptic fear.   
Interestingly Demos (2011) found similar spikes in correlation during the “flash crash” of May 2010 
as well as immediately succeeding the Japanese earth quake in 2011, where peaks in correlation 
demonstrated a reliable proactive indicator of further equity price declines.  
There is however one very pertinent explanation for this correlation during the current derivative 
influenced equity exchanges.  According to Demos (2011) many traders, by mandate, are forced to 
pare back their market positions (long and short) in the event of significant levels of volatility 
 Figure 25: VIX Index and Dow Jones Industrial Average Correlation 
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exceeding their value-at-risk limits.  This ultimately results in equity correlation being pushed to even 
higher levels.  Attested by Crotty (2009, p.571) ‘Most prices fall together as investors run for liquidity 
and safety, and correlations invariably head toward one, as they did in the recent crises’, namely 2001 
and 2008. 
The bias towards equities as a measure of asset bubble identification has a foundation in the research 
conducted by Camerer (1989).  Broadly considering all asset classes we must acknowledge that the 
most likely argument against asset bubbles existing is the potential restrictions on the scope of the 
market.  An example of such a restriction could be considered a finite lifetime of T periods for the 
asset (let us assume a five year US government note).  Backward induction dictates that under this 
restriction price bubbles should theoretically not occur.  Suffice to say that upon time period T no 
logical market participant will pay more that the terminal value of the asset for its ownership.  
Therefore we can reasonably deduce that any market participant acting under rational expectations 
will be willing to purchase this asset for more than the discounted terminal value at period T – 1 (or a 
close approximate amount incorporating for risk differentials).  On this basis we can dismiss the likely 
hood of an asset price bubble based on the restriction of all market participants’ ability to anticipate an 
ending.  
 
According to Camerer (1989), many empirical studies which have been conducted to provide 
evidence of the growth of an asset bubble are flawed in construction.  The identified problem with 
many of these studies is the assumption that the money supply is exogenous, i.e. market fundamentals, 
controlled by government policy, are assumed to be independent of a bubble.  
 
Given the fact that bubbles are likely to cause aberrantly large positive price changes as they inflate 
(particularly in the final growth stages), followed by extreme negative price changes upon bursting, 
the distribution of price changes will have negative skewness and large kurtosis if the presence of a 
bubble is confirmed, Camerer (1989).  Following this logic Blanchard and Watson (1982) were able 
to confirm this pattern for gold prices, and Fama (1976) was able to identify a similar pattern for stock 
prices.  Using stock prices, West (1987) found sturdy evidence of the existence of a bubble that is 
correlated with dividends.  Meese (1986) utilising the same test to foreign exchange rates identified 
confirmation of bubbles in dollar-mark and dollar-pound exchange rates. 
The dotcom bubble witnessed during the turn of the millennium saw the rapid increase of internet 
company stock prices as investors confused scientific breakthroughs with financial breakthroughs.  
If equity prices are indeed based upon rational cash flow forecasts, price changes should possess a 
constant conditional mean (implying independence), and prices should conform to a martingale.  For 
example all equity valuations are conducted independently by numerous market participants, thus 
price movements are derived from independent valuations (and immune to contagious market bias).  
If however equity price changes are not independent, a bubble like influence lacking fundamental 
evidence is clearly present, Camerer (1989).  An extended and forceful market movement either 
positive or negative places a severe test on price trend sustainability. 
 
US Treasury Spreads 
A simplistic observation made by Graham, Dodd, and Cottle (1962) was that ‘empirical evidence 
suggests that a drop in stock [current] yields below that of bond [current] yields, caused by rising 
stock prices has proven a sure indication that the market has entered a dangerously high level’.  To the 
extent of the return on risky assets being less than that of risk-free assets, clearly this serves as 
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evidence market irregularity.   Whilst this insight perhaps held merit during earlier decades modern 
evidence fails to confirm the explanatory power of this methodology in recent decades to any 
acceptable degree of significance.  
Common to Graham’s method - in terms of simplicity - there appears to be a renewed binary type of 
observation, which may provide a signal of market participant’s behaviour, namely the spread 
between the 3-month current US Treasury Bill yields and the 10-year current Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate.  Intimate inspection of the deviations between these two instruments provides a 
surprising result when referencing the observations to the returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Index.  Whilst evident inaccuracies are present (fails as an exact measure), one cannot dismiss the 
apparent predictive qualities of this unconventional theoretical screen.  As evidenced in the graphs 
below, it appears that confirmation that a Treasury Bill current yield exceeding current yields of the 
competing Treasury Note (a contradiction to the popular liquidity preference theory) indicates the 
increased likelihood of stock market excess (perhaps as investors satisfy their growing appetite for 
equities at the expense of investing in Treasury Notes), and thus an impending price correction.  In the 
context of this research a correction has been defined as an index price decline exceeding not less than 
20% over a rolling (moving average) annual period.  For the purposes of objectivity should a stock 
price correction be confirmed, the earliest date of the rolling annual period is termed the initiation of 
the stock price correction, as illustrated in the graph below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visibly evident in the graphical illustration above, recognition of the observed relationship whereby 
3-Month Treasury Bills current yields exceed the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate would 
have provided predictive insight into six of the seven crises observed of this period of study.  Of 
particular apprehension is the superior ability to anticipate the two most recent crises, namely the ‘dot 
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com’ crisis of 2001 and the more recent Global Financial Crisis which by this definition commenced 
as early as 2007.  Observing our formerly prudent definition of a price correction, the earliest 
commencement of the 2001 price correction can be observed as the 13
th
 of July 2001.  As illustrated 
in figure 26 this correction comes several months after the initial 3-month Treasury Bill rate was 
recorded as having breached the respective 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, which took 
place on the 1
st
 of September 2000.  Similarly a breach on the 1
st
 of September 2006 provided a 
remarkably accurate cautionary to market participants of the heightened risk of a price collapse.  By 
the third quarter of 2007 equity prices collapsed.  The challenge of identifying an asset bubble, 
according to Camerer (1989), can perhaps be circumvented if equity bubbles boast common statistical 
properties which do not depend on the specification of market fundamentals that underlie an assets’ 
intrinsic value, such as that provided by observing Treasury yield spreads (the difference between 3-
month and 10 year Treasuries). Whilst admittedly this observation would gain credibility from further 
statistical testing, nonetheless this observation may provide a premature substitute for Graham’s 
antiquated screen for assets price irregularity.   
 
II. Post-Recession Recovery Prospects (Sub-Saharan Africa) 
 
In the context of this research practical validity has been enhanced by providing a framework 
projection of the post 2008 Global Financial Crisis Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expectations for 
the Sub-Saharan African region.  By utilising multiple regression analysis we are not only able to 
augment our understanding of the post crisis implications in an emerging market context, but further 
we also provide the insight into the degree of global integration present in the traditionally segmented 
Sub-Saharan Africa region.   
 
Through multiple regression analysis the projected annual percentage change in GDP for the Sub-
Saharan African region has been forecast and presented in figure 28 below.  Beginning with this 
regional forecast one can begin to systematically analyse prospects for regions, culminating with a 
country specific stress test.  Given recent global economic turmoil, the ability to accurately isolate risk 
on a country specific basis proves market participant with an invaluable intuition for purposes of 
regional investability.  
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Multiple regression input variables derived from the International Monetary Fund data base: 
 
GDP (constant 
prices) 
Gross National 
Savings 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
External 
Debt 
Percentage Change 
in GDP 
1980 277.545 61.32356775 0.519 65.465 
 
1981 274.109 46.53274384 -17.542 76.631 -1.24% 
1982 271.411 36.0433808 -16.363 88.634 -0.98% 
1983 234.304 39.16625664 -8.736 97.334 -13.67% 
1984 202.647 35.4834897 -4.45 100.084 -13.51% 
1985 187.634 33.98802276 -0.078 107.112 -7.41% 
1986 205.397 33.01756775 -4.937 123.267 9.47% 
1987 230.61 38.788602 -1.887 137.079 12.28% 
1988 250.251 42.41253948 -6.794 142.561 8.52% 
1989 252.42 44.2593228 -4.028 143.09 0.87% 
1990 290.592 51.9287904 -2.352 167.196 15.12% 
1991 295.706 46.72746212 -4.956 177.976 1.76% 
1992 303.192 45.03310776 -6.461 174.546 2.53% 
1993 282.119 39.93394445 -5.839 181.415 -6.95% 
1994 267.435 41.1422004 -5.987 189.882 -5.20% 
1995 319.616 46.46897024 -9.898 206.838 19.51% 
1996 334.672 53.8319912 -4.718 212.056 4.71% 
1997 333.881 52.79660253 -6.835 209.537 -0.24% 
1998 315.277 44.50450132 -15.532 205.275 -5.57% 
1999 317.415 44.818998 -10.352 206.642 0.68% 
2000 329.84 60.4860592 2.209 208.539 3.91% 
2001 315.988 53.50940792 -4.609 201.968 -4.20% 
2002 335.08 53.7233764 -12.258 203.151 6.04% 
2003 429.365 71.10713765 -11.808 221.227 28.14% 
2004 537.028 96.7724456 -7.885 233.368 25.07% 
2005 627.923 121.8421789 -0.731 215.005 16.93% 
2006 719.16 180.9190812 30.58 183.95 14.53% 
2007 828.738 196.236871 12.458 203.718 15.24% 
2008 940.379 210.3063596 1.219 211.424 13.47% 
2009 894.81 175.114317 -27.845 222.11 -4.85% 
2010 1043.624 206.5123171 -24.562 246.384 16.63% 
2011 1201.285 236.9895048 -21.104 266.672 15.11% 
2012 1274.055563 254.331974 -25.575 298.27 6.06% 
2013 1394.100725 271.0668783 -36.257 326.057 9.42% 
2014 1494.62818 286.1706691 -46.959 326.057 7.21% 
2015 1606.356458 303.5004414 -58.235 326.057 7.48% 
2016 1701.393032 317.8463913 -68.276 326.057 5.92% 
2017 1970.77631 371.9122774 -81.477 326.057 15.83% 
 
 
Despite the uncertainty which is inherent to forecasting, this research uses the statistical technique of 
multiple regression to establish the quantitative relationships between gross domestic product in 
Southern Africa, and the above mentioned independent variables. 
 
III.  
IV.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 28: Annual Percentage Change in GDP for Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Testament to the explanatory power of the inputs of this analysis in capturing the behaviour of the 
historic GDP trajectory is the admirable R square along with the statistical significance of the 
explanatory variables (however the intercept is found to be insignificant) as determined by robust t 
Stats and P-values.  Whilst admittedly only a modest number of explanatory variables have been 
utilised to construct this projection (and a degree of variable overlap), the output approximation 
provides valuable insight into expected GDP growth in the region.  Forecast GDP growth varying 
between five and ten percent appears both logical and favourable when viewed in a globalized 
context.  Whilst this projection provides a ‘best guess’ of future anticipations for the region, such a 
one-dimensional view remains vulnerable to overlooking the deficiency of emerging market 
symmetry (high correlation between emerging markets) and normality of returns, Estrada (2002).  
Given the innate nature of this research and a theme biased strongly towards understand economic 
consequences in a post recessionary context, the prospect of hypothesising an effective means to 
conduct an isolated country specific stress test becomes invaluable.  In pursuit of such a theory South 
Africa shall serve as our proxy for a vulnerable emerging market in the post 2008 global economic 
recovery.  The desire behind the successful construction of such a country specific stress test is that it 
might serve as a generic methodology capable of regional specific adjustments to be made useful in a 
universal risk management context.  Following our broad projections regarding Sub-Saharan Africa 
we narrow our study down to a single country within the region, namely South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 29: Snapshot of South African Economy 
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Inflation is expected to remain within the 
targeted band of 3% - 6%. Inflation has 
been derived from CPI as opposed to its oil 
shock benign GDP deflator counterpart.  
Inflationary declines provide valuable 
flexibility to contraction remedying 
monetary policy efforts. 
In line with global trends South African 
business confidence waned sharply during 
the 2008 Crisis from its 2006 pre-recession 
highs.  Despite the modest recovery to date 
business confidence remains fragile and 
thus a likely hurdle to the efficient 
allocation of capital in the private sector. 
GDP growth which experienced a sharp 
decline in 2008 has since returned to 
positive growth.  Whilst less desirable than 
many emerging market peers, GDP growth 
levels appear largely hostage to the 
economic health of broader Europe (the 
countries primary export market). 
Consistent with the global trend of 
accommodative monetary policy, South 
Africa remains representative of emerging 
markets in its more modest policy 
execution.  With inflationary pressures 
easing further rate cuts remain a possibility 
should economic growth appear to stagnate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Target Inflation Forecast Quarterly GDP Growth Business Confidence Index South African Repo Rate 
Source: SARB Source: SARB Source: RMB/BER
 
 Source: SARB 
Source: www.global-rates.com 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.998742545 
R Square 0.997486671 
Adjusted R Square 0.997217386 
Standard Error 14.38874822 
Observations 32 
 
  
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -3.691969504 9.22673057 -0.40014 0.692091 -22.5920703 15.20813129 -22.5920703 15.20813129 
Gross National Savings 4.102748273 0.050188251 81.74719 7.26E-35 3.999942301 4.205554245 3.999942301 4.205554245 
Current Account Balance -3.603102566 0.250484643 -14.3845 1.85E-14 -4.116197098 -3.090008035 -4.116197098 -3.090008035 
External Debt 0.464163838 0.060468893 7.676076 2.32E-08 0.340298925 0.588028751 0.340298925 0.588028751 
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The intention of this admittedly shallow economic overview of the post 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
South African economy is to provide a rudimentary foundation upon which one is able to expand.  
Following the above economic introduction our attention now shifts to the task of attempting to gauge 
the country specific risk applicable to an investor in this country’s sovereign debt issue.  In this 
research sovereign debt has been used as a proxy for general country risk. 
 
III. Country Specific Stress Test (South Africa) 
Radical work by Taylor (1995) utilised a financial market prices framework to explain the impact of a 
change in monetary policy on real gross domestic product and inflation.  In researching this 
relationship his measurement of financial market prices focused primarily on three types of prices: 
exchange rates, long-term interest rate yields, and short-term interest rate yields (federal funds rate) 
without a distinction between developed and emerging economies.  With the objective of establishing 
a uniform means of stress-testing a country, this research draws significantly on the findings of 
Ruggerone (2004).  Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis the application of country stress-
testing is increasingly observed to have undertaken a macroeconomic focus.  By providing regulators 
and policymakers with the ability to analyse latent risks unique to a country’s economy by 
hypothesizing grave market price variations (exchange rates, interest rates, asset prices, etc.) country 
specific stress-testing is becoming an increasingly valuable tool in the framework of policy making.  
Well-constructed stress tests provide anticipatory insight into the potential vulnerabilities of domestic 
and international financial systems to unforeseen macroeconomic considerations.  The primary 
objective of this research is to provide a practical explanation of the post 2008 methodical evolution 
of country stress-testing with a specific focus on one emerging market, namely South Africa.  
Following the explanation of how such a stress-test can be constructed, a discussion of the various 
input variables to be shocked will be proposed, thereby providing a generic framework amiable to 
customisation.   
In order to make the stress test meaningful, country risk shall be defined from the perspective of 
market participants holding government issued debt.  Under this definition the intention of the stress 
test can be expanded to incorporate various scenarios which strain a country’s ability to withstand 
post-recession macroeconomic shocks, as well as monetary and fiscal measures initially implemented 
as a remedy for the economic contraction.   By describing country risk in terms of a demarcated 
monetary value (potential investor losses) from the perspective of a market participant, stress-testing 
provides an objective means to analyse the effects of potentially materialising of vulnerabilities that 
would effect a country’s dynamics.  An extreme example would be a holder of government debt 
forced to endure substantial write-downs on the face value of their government issued assets, 
following the crisis induced restructuring of government debt (a good example comes in the form of 
Greece following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis).   
 
Materials & Statistical Methodology 
Conventional analysis of a countries creditworthiness hinges on macroeconomic variables such as a 
countries aggregate income and expenditure flows.  Under these parameters, a country’s financial 
soundness is a consequence of forecasts of its ability to generate income (primarily through taxes and 
exports), as well as the extent this income exceeds public expenditure, interest and principal debt 
repayments.  Whilst the importance of macroeconomic considerations remain irrefutable, in the case 
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of emerging markets it is essential to extend this analysis in order to improve on the quality of a 
country’s risk assessment.  Observations made in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, where 
government guarantees - whether explicit or implicit - were extended to the banking and financial 
sector, add credibility to this progression.  Governments and central banks were often observed 
alleviating the probability of default of domestic banks and financial institutions at the expense of 
burdening state accounts, which may in extreme circumstances threaten the country’s economic and 
financial stability. 
Assessing Down-Side Risk 
A simplistic process, constructed first by Ruggerone (2004), by which a countries default credit VAR 
can be computed, along with how such estimate of the countries credit VAR can be expected to react 
to changes in the country risk assessment is presented below.   
From the perspective of a market participant invested in government issued debt the computation of 
the expected loss (EL) and the unexpected loss (UL) can be deduced algebraically, Ruggerone (2004). 
EL =                 
UL = √                     
Where: 
LGD = loss given default 
  = probability of default 
√       = degree of unexpected loss as found by Ruggerone (2004) 
 
A prerequisite for the computation of this credit VAR are the following simplifying assumptions: 
i. The default probability is distributed as a binomial, default and no-default.  For example 
either South Africa will default on its sovereign debt, or it will not. 
ii. The recovery rate in the event of default is 40 per cent, therefore the expected write-down 
is (1 - 40%) which we have termed the loss given default.  Degrees of potential loss are 
flexible to analyst prudence.  This 40 per cent recovery rate assumption is customisable, 
and has been randomly generated in this example for purposes of illustration. 
iii. The probability of default ( ) can simply be extracted from the respective sovereign 
rating, denoting the relative peer default probability.  The investment term within which 
the default probability will be contextualised may be subject to analyst judgement.  For 
the purposes of illustration consider a five year BB rated sovereign bond with 1.08% 
default probability. 
Estimation of the          comparable to normal distribution can be done by simply multiplying the 
UL by 3.08.  By multiplying the unexpected loss by 3.08 we are simulating the probability of an 
unexpected loss materialising and assessing the estimated loss (following a normal distribution) 
within a 99.9 per cent level of confidence.  The exposure to country risk can then be summarised in 
the table below. 
Country Exposure   
(R million) 
Rating LGD   EL UL    
       
(R million) 
South Africa 100 BB 0.6 1.08% 0.648 6.20 19.1 
 
= 1.08 X 0.6 = √                   
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In light of the assumptions, the current risk applicable to a portfolio of R100 million of South African 
government bonds is R19.1 million.  This represents a current maximum of 19.1% down-side risk on 
the portfolio given a high degree of statistical probability.  Whilst this simplistic example proves 
valuable in demonstrating the construction of country risk it remains vulnerable to several 
assumptions.  Analysts may consider adjusting recovery rates (likely to be derived from global rating 
agencies) which differ by not only financial robustness of the country, but also by government attitude 
towards the honouring of debt.  Admittedly the effectiveness of the above analysis remains 
significantly influenced by the opinion of rating agencies (their credibility questioned in the prior 
reading), and remains hostage to the approximation of a probability of default.  In the above example 
reliance on rating agencies and their internally computed credit rating for countries provides the basis 
for this analysis (both probability of default and the likely loss given default are derived directly from 
rating agencies). 
 
Importance of Stress-Testing in Emerging Economies 
Abundant empirical evidence identifies the higher levels of volatility experienced in emerging 
markets.  It is widely believed that additional volatility in emerging markets can be attributed to 
characteristics unique to countries experiencing capital account liberalisation.  The vast variations in 
the credit ratings of emerging economies and their developed peers appears largely testament to the 
risks of unstable capital flows resulting from political, structural, or economic developments.   
Investors in these volatility-prone countries run the risk of substantial losses in the event of a credit 
downgrade, and the subsequence waning of investor’s sentiment towards the country’s government 
issued debt.  As described previously, the deterioration of an emerging country’s credit rating is often 
accompanied by a significant and abrupt outflow of capital, causing asset values to decline and / or 
the domestic currency to plummet.  The wellbeing of an investor’s stake in an emerging markets debt 
is thus intrinsically tied to the opinion of global rating giants. 
A second reason why investors might be concerned about emerging markets risk extends to its ability 
to deteriorate the credit ratings of banks, other financial institutions, and the domestic corporate 
sector.   That is, sovereign debt is regarded as the closes to risk-free investment within a country, as 
such sovereign debt forms a floor upon which alternative ratings of institutions within the respective 
country are based.  Should this risk materialise there will be an increasing cost for these institutions to 
obtain necessary capital from international capital markets.  The subsequent cost of capital in this 
emerging country will likely retard future productivity.  The importance of assessing the financial 
consequences stemming from a country’s specific vulnerabilities becomes obvious.  A country stress 
test provides a superior insight into the financial costs that an emerging market based a company 
might be subjected to, should a deterioration in country risk materialise.   
A final vulnerability to an emerging market country’s risk rating is applicable primarily to institutions 
such as banks and insurance companies, who maintain substantial regulated collateral in the form of 
government bonds.  Legislation/regulation in many regions restricts risk management diversification 
by demonstrating a bias for domestic bond requirements.  Therefore, these institutions are often found 
to have an unbalanced exposure to excessively volatile emerging economies.  Therefore, an on-going 
construction of a stress-test scenario which provides the opportunity to objectively anticipate 
upcoming sovereign creditworthiness provides an essential consideration upon which institutions can 
enhance their strategic decisions. 
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Contingent Claims Analysis 
Ruggerone (2004) provides a framework from which we are able to extend the Merton-based 
methodology by applying concepts borrowed from his contingent claims analysis (CCA) for the 
purposes of analysing sovereign and country risk.  The Merton-based methodology assesses the credit 
risk of a company by characterising the company's equity as a call option on its assets.  Following 
which put-call parity is then used to identify the firm's implied credit risk.  
Building on the conventional application in private firms, CCA can be adapted to value countries, 
Ruggerone (2004).  The underlying assumption of CCA is that assets issued by a financial entity are 
subject to volatility, and that the value of such volatile assets is dependent on the seniority or priority 
of the owners claim.  The inherent value of an entity which is financed through debt and equity V(t)is 
the sum of equity E(t) and debt D(t) and is similarly equal to total assets A(t) plus reserves R(t).  
Given that asset/bond prices are stochastic the possibility exists for their prices to decline below the 
face value of the debt plus accrued interest, we term this the default barrier (DB) [the sum of the face 
value of the debt and accrued interest], as under these circumstances a financial entity is assumed to 
default/partially default.  Owners of junior claims (such as equity holders) possess at maturity (T) a 
contingent claim on the residual assets, once all debt has been taken into consideration.  In other 
words equity holders will either receive the difference between A(t) and DB, or nothing at all.  
Moreover, the value of risky debt at maturity (T), i.e. D(T), will equal DB less the maximum between 
the difference of DB and A(T), or once again nothing at all.  Therefore: 
                         
                                                               [         ]        [         ] 
 
Recognisable is the interpretation of both a call and put option in the equation above.  Therefore we 
can state that the value of a country at maturity (T) is simply the sum of a call option plus the default 
free value of the debt issued DB, less a put option, Ruggerone (2004).  Now with the assistance of the 
Black-Scholes formula we are able to calculate a value of both call and put options.  The latter, for 
example can be deduced by: 
                       
Where: 
N = cumulative distribution function for a standard normal variable 
R = risk-free rate 
   = 
  (
 
  
) (  
 
 
  
 ) 
  √ 
 
  =      √  
Note that    is defined as the risk-neutral distance to default and its cumulative distribution is the 
risk-neutral probability to default. 
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Substitution of the applicable country elements into the equation presented above provides an 
opportunity to find the ‘value’ of the country under scrutiny.  Ruggerone (2004) goes further to 
describe the assets to be considered when the entity under assessment is a country: 
o Currency reserves 
o Equity held in public assets 
o The right to issue money (siegniorage) 
o Fiscal revenues (adjusted for time value of money) 
Liabilities include: 
o Currency debt (local and foreign) 
o Present discounted value of public expenditures 
o Financial guarantees 
o Money in circulation 
According to Ruggerone (2004) variations to the assets and / or liabilities mentioned above will result 
in a non-linear impact on the value of the value of the options (and DB), and ultimately the country.  
For instance a government who issued financial guarantees to financial institutions following the 
initial outbreak of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, would have increased their liabilities (and DB) 
thus deteriorating the country’s credit merit and increasing the country’s risk.  The down-side 
resulting from a lack of government intervention is not considered under this framework. 
Stress-testing of a country by extension of the CCA is conducted by manipulating a countries assets 
and liabilities in accordance with the analysts’ views on: 
o Future fiscal position 
o Vulnerability to finance a decline in confidence 
o Probability of a rapid depreciation in the foreign exchange rate  
o Exploitation of quantitative easing 
o Governments standpoint toward the private sector 
Under the proposed framework it becomes possible to conduct a stress-test scrutinising the robustness 
of a country’s economic and financial prospects, and ultimately gauge the vulnerability of a country’s 
creditworthiness.  
 
Practical Stress Test of South Africa 
For the purpose of demonstration the hypothetical stress test below employs the triangular approach 
of expected market default scenario, intermediate default scenario, and worst-case default scenario.  
In line with the previous explanation, the stress test contained in figure 30 has been taken from the 
perspective of a market participant holding South African government issued debt, with the put option 
presented below as the capital recovered in the event of a default materialising.  Whilst susceptible to 
criticism of over simplification the simulation below has been constructed to provide practical 
example of how to utilise the Black-Scholes formula in assessing a country’s risk.  Admittedly, the 
results of the stress test below are primarily reliant on vague assumptions used, however as previously 
discussed a more coherent stress test may be conducted by detailed computation of the various inputs.    
In the case of the stress test below we begin by specifying a time horizon of twelve months, and 
perhaps more specifically the graph on the right hand side has depicted a five year bond with twelve 
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months outstanding to maturity.  Given the priority of accuracy as well as the complexity of 
conducting a country stress test it is advisable to limit distant estimations of the vast number of 
variables, as this tend to dilute credibility.  Once an acceptable time horizon has been defined, we 
begin to postulate the country’s value in accordance with the considerations mentioned above.  By 
identifying the variables which need to be shocked we can then begin to construct the proposed 
degrees of stress placed on the country given varying degrees of crisis with the intention of 
establishing a meaningful perspective on how the country’s risk responds under differing 
environments.  For simplicity the example below has made use of several assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the example above recovery rates have been assumed to decline in line with the severity of the 
stresses placed on the debt issuing government.  Practically their ability to honour their debt and 
subsequently avoid forcing losses onto the beneficiaries of such obligations will be a function of a 
detailed analysis of a country’s assets and liabilities.  The assumed volatility would be an estimate 
directly derived from empirical market observations.  Logic dictates that with the increased severity of 
the crisis, the larger the fluctuations in the assets price.  Below is a graphical depiction of the 
randomly generated volatilities (as measured by standard deviation) used in the construction of the 
stress test in figure 30.  
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Figure 30: Simulated Stress Test of Hypothetical South African Treasury Bonds 
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Figure 31: Volatility as a Function of Standard Deviation 
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The final assumption which is evident in figure 32 is the proposed fluctuations in the risk-free rate.  
Whilst conventional practice favours the US Treasury Bills rate as the proxy for this hypothetical rate, 
given our geographical focus in conducting this analysis, we have made the bold supposition that the 
domestic South African repo rate will be fitting for a risk-free alternative.  Further in light of the 
theme of this paper, the assumption is also made that the repo rate will decline proportionately in line 
with the severity of the crisis, and as such will be utilised as a stabilisation focused monetary tool 
sensitive to economic contractions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Ruggerone (2004), in addition to the above mentioned standard macroeconomic 
variables, it is often necessary to consider other transmission channels through which a crisis 
instigating shocks might feed and influence the creditworthiness of a country.  Given the regional 
specific nature of these stress transfer mechanisms, a deep and comprehensive knowledge of the 
country under study is a prerequisite for reliable country risk projections.  For instance, whilst the role 
of government guarantees extended are a pivotal consideration when assessing a country’s risk, a 
more intimate knowledge of the country’s unique dynamics are likely to reveal further important 
sources of financial instability.   
 
Another conduit through which a country’s creditworthiness remains susceptible is the exchange rate. 
This is particularly prevalent in emerging markets where there is a heightened sensitivity to increases 
(or decreases) in capital flows.  In these instants negative fluctuations in the local currency are capable 
of enhancing the credit risk of such a country to the extent that the country is exposed to debt 
denominated in foreign currency.  A pertinent example of such a risk could be found in South Africa 
and Brazil, where debt is largely denominated in foreign currency.  In January 2012 alone the South 
African National Treasury issued $1.5 billion worth of US dollar denominated debt, National 
Treasury (2012).  Thus, an intimate understanding of the structure of a country’s debt can prove 
invaluable when building a country stress test, as it provides valuable intuition of how fluctuations in 
the country’s exchange rate may affect the financial position of a country, not to mention exchange 
rate implications beyond the nature of a country’s debt organisation. 
 
Another consideration particularly prevalent when considering the construction of an emerging 
market country stress test is the duration of the domestic-currency-denominated debt.  Ruggerone 
(2004) points out that in numerous emerging markets local currency debt is characterised by short 
durations, where service costs react almost instantaneously to monetary policy induced deviations in 
domestic rates.  Thus in periods of heightened uncertainty regarding currency depreciation, any 
 Figure 32: South African Repo Rate  
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reaction by the central bank to protect the currency (from depreciation) by raising short-term rates 
may come at the expense of domestic debt, thus placing the country’s stability at further risk. 
 
As a meaningful stress test should be intended to depict the impact of extreme yet plausible 
circumstances, Ruggerone (2004) advises utilising empirical observations when constructing a vector 
of shocks with which to subject the variables considered relevant for the country whose credit merit is 
under scrutiny.  Intuitively the on-going Global Financial Crisis remains unique in both scope and 
severity.  Therefore more will be demanded of an analyst’s imagination when producing a stress test 
which leaves room to encompass a worst case scenario, whilst remaining plausible to a broad 
audience. 
 
Results 
 
The analysis of country stress testing using the Black-Scholes Merton methodology provides a 
practical study of theoretically based monetary and fiscal hypotheses.  From a practical point of view 
the primary concern remains the operational importance of designing an appropriate stress test to 
gauge country risk with the possibility of customisation and application within a risk management 
context.  This development entails the valuable evolution of risk management in the hands of 
insurance companies, financial institutions, investors, and pension funds, to name a few.  In the event 
of sovereign spread corrosion, an analyst will use a higher discount rate implying a decline in the 
actual value of the sovereign bond portfolio under scrutiny, Ruggerone (2004). 
 
Whilst the framework of this stress test remains generic by nature, several considerations previously 
mentioned serve testament to an analyst’s ability to enhance the statistical accuracy of the forecasted 
scenarios.  A further consideration which comes to light upon practical implication is the presence of 
correlation amongst countries and their input variables.  Given our knowledge of inter country 
transmission mechanisms the assumption that one can focus exclusively on an isolated country’s risks 
appears naive.  As evidenced by the events which followed the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it is 
imperative that we acknowledge and account for spill-over effects and contagion as a menace to an 
otherwise healthy county risk level. 
 
The final warning is a reminder of the ever present detachment from theory to practical 
implementation.  Risk perceptions adopted by market participants have empirically not always proven 
logical nor predictable.  Financial theorists may be found describing this lack of conformity as 
“animal spits” of international markets.  Whilst easy enough to dismiss as anomalous market 
behaviour, this in fact poses the largest threat to the proposed country stress testing’s credibility.  
Empirically, the most aggressive corrosion of a country’s risk has been accompanied by irrational 
self-fulfilling investor expectations.  This often results in an economic and financial system reasoning 
which is susceptible to asset bubbles and beyond the default barrier.   
 
 
Chapter Four - Significance of the Research 
 
Despite the inherently unreliable nature of speculating on projected economic consequences, perhaps 
there is a benefit to taking stock of current US economic characteristics when investigating the merits 
of aggressive policy responses to a significant economic contraction.  It is true that at the time of 
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writing the US overall growth rate remains uninspiring, however dissection of the various elements 
evidence some intriguing shifts.  Consumer spending and housing appear to have declined in 
dominance, now accounting for just 65% of domestic growth.  Exports on the other hand have risen to 
43%, one of the strongest showings in any recent economic recovery, Economist Newspaper Limited 
(2012|C).   
Whilst it is easy to attribute short-term US economic progress to forcefully accommodative monetary 
policy, credit is similarly warranted to enhanced regulation.  One of the first discrepancies to be 
corrected was the inadequate capital ratios of banks at the time of the outbreak of the crisis.  As a 
condition of Federal assistance at the time, the US Treasury forced banks to raise adequate capital to 
be able to endure exceptionally dire scenarios of recession and loan write-offs.  It has been 
approximated that five of America’s largest banks have to date written off roughly $500 billion since 
2008, and have raised $318 billion in new capital.  As a result, many of their equity ratios (common 
stockholder’s equity / balance sheet assets) at present stand in excess of 10% exceeding both their pre- 
2008 crisis levels, as well as many of their embattled European peers, Economist Newspaper Limited 
(2012|C). 
Following the peak of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis accommodative monetary policy and the 
subsequent increase in market liquidity (whilst overlooking the pertinent benefits for a moment) adds 
to stock prices with a destabilizing effect.  Empirically, investors motivated by artificial levels of 
liquidity are likely to demonstrate irrationally exuberant behaviour placing little emphasis on market 
fundamentals.  Testament to this short-term motivated portfolio flow is the broad based stock market 
highs (fourth quarter of 2012) observed around the globe, while the logic of the fragile state of the 
present economic environment dictates that stock price valuation is not driven by fundamentals, but 
rather a function of aggressive monetary accommodation.  Initial periods of increasing the supply of 
money will almost surely result in increased government revenues (as central banks increase their 
exposure to government issued debt).  However, persistent monetary accommodation practices have 
empirically been observed as a root cause of excessive levels of revenue-eroding inflation.  Recalling 
that tax revenue is collected retrospectively (for example budget deficits expected to be offset by 
future tax revenue) it remains sensitive to hyper-inflationary environments.  In this context the 
proposed ability to actively manage levels of seignorage/quantitative easing cannot be overstated.  
Ben Bernanke in his research on the great depression found strong evidence that declines in output 
and employment demonstrated a strong correlation with both money and price declines.  Recent 
research taking a comparative perspective has greatly strengthened the empirical case for the money 
supply as a major driving force of economic recoveries, Bernanke (1995).  At present there appears to 
be consensus that forcing countries to avoid reflation neutralises one imperative response tool 
available to global central banks. 
 
Given the severity and scope of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis along with the fractured foundation 
upon which growth has as of late been achieved, it should come as no surprise that the findings of this 
research shows that the expected global growth trajectory in decades to come will be far less generous 
than those which we have become so accustomed to. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1999) conducted a conclusive study of various crises observed across 
20 countries, including 5 developed and 15 emerging economies.  Interestingly, financial liberation 
and significant credit expansions were found to be reliable precursors/predictors to the crises under 
review.  These measures appeared to be succeeded by an average excess rise of roughly 40% per year 
in equity prices, in addition to that experienced during periods of normality.  Upon the imminent 
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collapsing of equity prices, banks as well as other financial intermediaries were often found to have 
been harbouring excessive naked/unhedged exposure to these ‘desirable’ equities.  They observed that 
under these conditions roughly a year later a banking crisis ensues.  This was often accompanied by 
an exchange rate crisis as government found themselves having to choose between sacrificing interest 
rates (increasing interest rates at the expense of continued economic growth) and defending their 
currencies.   Inevitably, a contraction in output is witnessed and a recession is affirmed. 
 
Work by Taylor (1995) provides a valuable foundation in describing the linkages between monetary 
policy, real GDP and inflation.  Important distinctions need to be made between the short-term and 
long-term implications of monetary policy actions.  This research will concede that monetary policy 
implications for long-term gross national product levels remain resistant to short-term monetary 
policy actions (that is, log-term neutrality of monetary policy).  The focus therefore will be limited to 
short-term remedies to stimulating gross national product growth following a significant economic 
contraction. 
The pertinent empirical concern which requires thorough scrutiny, after the incorporation of asset 
prices into monetary policy has been accepted as a valid suggestion, is to what extent will a monetary 
policy response be justified?  Reactive interest rate increases along with the extracting of market 
liquidity needs to be considered in the context of the potential that a resultant economic contraction 
may well ensue.  Work by Roubini (2006) suggests both analytical arguments and empirical evidence 
that monetary policy is capable of pre-empting asset bubbles in much the same way as it does 
inflationary pressures.  Thus the argument of unavoidable economic contraction or severe financial 
distress may indeed be inconsistent with logical judgment.  Roubini goes further to highlight pre-2008 
observations in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand where moderate and gradual 
monetary policy tightening reacting to asset bubbles proved effective by avoiding triggering an 
economic crash.      
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